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COMMENTS
PLAYING THE GAME OF ACADEMIC
INTEGRITY VS. ATHLETIC SUCCESS: THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA)
AND INTERCOLLEGIATE STUDENT-
ATHLETES WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES
INTRODUCTION
At some point in our lives, most of us can recall being told by a parent,
friend, teacher, or coach, "It doesn't matter whether you win or lose, it's how
you play the game." The process that is used to determine eligibility to
participate in intercollegiate athletic programs under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)' and National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) 2 guidelines makes this clich6 take on a new meaning. The number of
students reporting learning disabilities in colleges and universities has
significantly increased in the last fifteen years. 3 In 1988, prior to the passage
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA into law on
July 26, 1990. Congress outlined the purpose of the Act as follows:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive ... mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide ... consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination ... ; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established [under the] Act; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional
authority... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced.., by people with
disabilities.
§ 12101(b).
2. See Compl. 6, United States v. NCAA (D.D.C. 1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/ncaacomp.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2005). Justice Department complaint
defining the NCAA as follows:
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is an unincorporated association whose
members are over one thousand colleges and universities throughout the United States .... The
NCAA sanctions, supervises and promotes athletic competition among its members. The
NCAA's activities include determining whether student-athletes attending its member colleges
and universities ... are eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics; sanctioning
intercollegiate athletic events ... ; and executing contracts related to intercollegiate athletic
events.
Id.
3. Katie M. Burroughs, Learning Disabled Student Athletes: A Sporting Chance Under the
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of the ADA, the most common disability identified by college students was
"partially sighted or blind"; by 2000, "learning disability" had moved into the
top position.4 This difference in the rankings equated to 16 percent of 1988
freshmen students with disabilities identifying a learning disability; by 2000,
this biennial survey by the American Council on Education reported that of the
71,046 disabilities identified by entering freshmen at four-year colleges,
26,739 (over 40 percent) were learning disabilities.5 During that twelve-year
period and subsequent to it, disability discrimination litigation involving
higher education has experienced steady activity in the courts and federal
agencies with enforcement authority, such as the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ).
"The area of greatest activity with respect to disability litigation in higher
education involves learning disabilities."6 The reason for the increase in
litigation has been attributed in part to the greater number of students with
diagnosed learning disabilities who are already enrolled or are seeking
admission to colleges. 7 This is the result of better identification of disabled
students due to special education mandates, heightened awareness of
individual rights, and increased research and understanding about learning
disabilities. 8
A significant subset of the disability cases concerning higher education is
lawsuits filed by student-athletes 9 with learning disabilities. The increased
ADA?, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 57 (1997) (stating that learning disabilities are being
diagnosed at a rate of 200,000 students per year).
4. CATHY HENDERSON, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., 2001 COLLEGE FRESHMEN WITH
DISABILITIES: A BIENNIAL STATISTICAL PROFILE 5 (2001), available at
http://www.heath.gwu.edu/PDFs/collegefreshmen.pdf.
Since 1966, a national survey of college students has been administered to a large sample of
freshmen each year. This survey is conducted by the Cooperative Institutional Research
Program (CIRP) and is cosponsored by the American Council on Education (ACE) and the
Graduate School of Education and Information Studies at the University of California, Los
Angeles (UCLA).
Id. at 1-2. The sample size consisted of 269,413 of the reported 1.1 million first-time, full-time
freshmen entering four-year institutions in 2000. Id. at 2.
5. Id. at 7. The 71,046 disabilities were reported by 66,197 students. Id. The breakdown of the
26,739 reported disabilities by type of institution were: Public - 12,835; Independent - 13,369;
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) - 535. Id. The survey also identified 19
percent of students with learning disabilities as students of color. Id. at 10.
6. Laura F. Rothstein, Higher Education and the Future of Disability Policy, 52 ALA. L. REV.
241, 249 (2000).
7. Id. See also HENDERSON, supra note 4, at 22 (noting a survey that found that "[almong
students with disabilities, those with learning disabilities were the least likely to have been offered
financial assistance as an incentive to enroll").
8. Rothstein, supra note 6, at 249-50.
9. Jonathan L. H. Nygren, Forcing the NCAA to Listen: Using Labor Law to Force the NCAA to
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prevalence of these cases, coupled with discrimination claims regarding racial
disparities in eligibility rates, led the NCAA to enter into a consent decree
with the DOJ in May 1998 obligating the NCAA to modify its eligibility
requirements for learning disabled student-athletes.' 0 These cases frequently
arise when the student-athlete's learning disability affects his or her eligibility
for a scholarship under NCAA rules. " I
Armed with the knowledge that the NCAA had chosen to enter into a
consent decree rather than defend against litigation allegations of disability
discrimination filed by the DOJ, this paper was initially launched under the
premise that learning-disabled student-athletes were not given fair and equal
access to collegiate athletic programs. Upon completing a review of court
cases, print media, law reviews, and other sources, my position has shifted to a
significant degree in the opposite direction. This paper will demonstrate that
when high school teachers, college professors, coaches, administrators, the
NCAA, and the courts follow the legislative spirit and mandates of the ADA, a
student-athlete with a learning disability has a bona fide chance to successfully
pursue his or her athletic and educational aspirations. Sadly, this paper will
also show that athletic eligibility often times has not been counterbalanced
with maintenance of academic integrity. There have been instances in which
colleges and the NCAA have unfairly screened out qualified students with
learning disabilities who were entitled to ADA accommodations. However, in
the alternative, the ADA also has been used as a way of accessing talented
student-athletes, with and without learning disabilities, who were not
adequately prepared for the rigors of college work.
This paper will explore the legal and ethical obligations of collegiate
institutions and the NCAA to accommodate student-athletes with learning
disabilities, with a greater emphasis on the male athlete, and the courts' review
of that process. Part I will define and provide an overview of the learning
Bargain Collectively with Student-athletes, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 359, 361 (2003) (noting that
Walter Byers, the executive director of the NCAA from 1952-1987, was credited with inventing the
term "student athlete" in the 1950s to emphasize that collegiate athletes are students first). The
NCAA used the term to defend against litigation brought by injured athletes seeking to recover from
NCAA member institutions under workers' compensation statutes. Id. See also WALTER BYERS,
UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 68-69 (1995).
10. See, e.g., Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96-C-6953, 1996 WL 680000, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21,
1996) (denying eligibility to a learning disabled swimmer who did not meet standardized test score
and grade point average requirements); Cureton v. NCAA, No. Civ. A. 97-181, 1997 WL 634376, at
*I (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1997) (alleging that race discrimination in the NCAA eligibility determination
process led to the plaintiffs' lost recruiting opportunities and full NCAA Division I eligibility solely
because of their low SAT scores).
II. See, e.g., Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Bowers v. NCAA, 974 F.
Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997); Butler v. NCAA, No. C96-16560, 1996 WL 1058233 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8,
1996).
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disabilities frequently identified by student-athletes seeking accommodation.
Part II will consist of an analysis of the ADA, defining "disability" under the
ADA, and further addressing its application in the mental health context. Part
III will analyze the impact of recent Supreme Court rulings in the Sutton
trilogy,12 considering the role of mitigating factors to accommodate physical
disabilities in employment discrimination cases and its subsequent
applicability to the mental disability arena in non-employment cases. Part IV
will examine the past and present role of the NCAA, specifically addressing
the current impact of eligibility standards on learning-disabled student-
athletes. Part V will compare judicial responses to lawsuits brought against
collegiate institutions and the NCAA before and after Sutton. Finally, the
paper will conclude that the challenges associated with athletic success versus
academic integrity for collegiate institutions, student-athletes, and the NCAA
are not going away any time soon. However, the conclusion will explore how
university presidents, athletic directors, coaches, faculty, parents, and students
must accept more responsibility for ensuring that special entitlements are
provided only to those qualified to receive them.
I. LEARNING DISABILITY AND THE STUDENT-ATHLETE
A. Learning Disabilities Generally
Learning disabilities as a diagnostic category for describing people with
learning problems were first defined in 1962.13 Prior to that time, low
academic achievement was usually attributed to generalized cognitive
limitations or a lack of motivation. 14 It is now commonly accepted that
learning disabilities "cannot be attributed to poor intelligence, poor
motivation, or inadequate teaching." 15 While mental health professionals in
the private, government, and education sector have still failed to adopt a single
consensus definition for learning disabilities, there is agreement that one
common feature of learning disabled individuals is a significant "discrepancy
12. The following three disability employment discrimination cases were decided by the
Supreme Court on June 22, 1999, and have generally subsequently been referred to as the "Sutton
trilogy" in legal journals: Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United
Postal Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
13. ACCOMMODATIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT (ADA) 131 (Michael Gordon & Shelby Kaiser, eds., 2000) [hereinafter ACCOMMODATIONS].
14. Id.
15. See United States Department of Justice, What Is a Learning Disability?, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/leamfac.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
[Vol. 15:2
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between... educational aptitude and... actual educational achievement."' 16
The United States Office of Education has developed the definition that is
the basis for determining learning disabilities in school-age children. 17
Another federal entity, the Interagency Committee on Learning Disabilities,
developed a definition that was acceptable to all of the federal agencies on the
committee except the U.S. Department of Education.' 8 The Rehabilitation
Services Administration, another government agency, formulated a definition
that focused on work. 19 The Learning Disabilities Association of America,
20
16. Melissa Krueger, The Future of ADA Protection for Students with Learning Disabilities in
Post-Secondary and Graduate Environments, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 607, 617 (2000) (quoting Lisa
Eichhom, Reasonable Accommodations & Awkward Compromises: Issues Concerning Learning
Disabled Students and Professional Schools in the Law School Context, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 31, 33
(1997)). See also Samuel S. Heywood, Without Lowering the Bar: Eligibility for Reasonable
Accommodations on the Bar Exam for Learning Disabled Individuals Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 33 GA. L. REV. 603, 610 (1999).
17. National Institute for Literacy, Important Definitions of Learning Disabilities, at
http://www.nifl.gov/nifl/ld/archive/insert.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
The term 'specific learning disability' means a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological
processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which may
manifest itself in an imperfect ability to listen, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical
calculations. The term includes such conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal
brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. The term does not include children who
have learning disabilities which are primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor handicaps;




Learning disabilities are defined as a generic term that refers to a heterogeneous group of
disorders manifested by significant difficulties in acquisition and use of listening, speaking,
reading, writing, reasoning, ormathematical abilities, or ofsocial skills. These disorders are
intrinsic to the individual and presumed to be due to central nervous system dysfunction. Even
though a learning disability may occur concomitantly with other handicapping conditions, (e.g.,
sensory impairment, mental retardation, social and emotional disturbance), with
socioenvironmental influences (e.g., cultural differences, insufficient or inappropriate
instruction, or psychogenic factors), and especially attention deficit disorder, all of which may
cause learning problems, a learning disability is not the direct result of those conditions or
influences.
Id.
The Department of Education is taking a more definitive position in excluding consideration of
socioeconomic and environmental factors for diagnostic purposes. Id.
19. Id. The Rehabilitation Services Administration defines a specific learning disability as:
a disorder in one or more of the central nervous system processes involved in perceiving,
understanding, and/or using concepts through verbal (spoken or written) language or nonverbal
means." This disorder manifests itself with a deficit in one or more of the following areas:
attention, reasoning, processing, memory, communication, reading, writing, spelling, calculation,
coordination, social competence, and emotional maturity.
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one of the largest private advocacy groups for the learning disabled in the
United States, has a different definition reflecting its view.2 1
The National Joint Committee on Learning Disabilities (NJCLD),22
another private organization, has developed the definition that is acceptable to
most advocacy and professional organizations. The NJCLD defines learning
disabilities as follows:
Learning disabilities is a general term that refers to a
heterogeneous group of disorders manifested by significant
disorders in the acquisition and use of listening, speaking, reading,
writing, reasoning, or mathematical skills.
These disorders are intrinsic to the individual and presumed to be
due to a central nervous system dysfunction, and may occur across
the life span. Problems in self-regulatory behaviors, social
perception, and social interaction may exist with learning
disabilities, but do not, by themselves, constitute a learning
disability.
Although learning disabilities may occur concomitantly with other
disabilities (e.g., sensory impairment, mental retardation, serious
emotional disturbance), or with extrinsic influences (such as
cultural differences, insufficient or inappropriate instruction), they
are not the result of those conditions or influences. 23
Learning disabilities lead to marked impairments in the development of
20. The Learning Disabilities Association of America was formerly known as the Association for
Children with Learning Disabilities.
21. National Institute for Literacy, supra note 17. The Association for Children with Learning
Disabilities defines specific learning disabilities as
a chronic condition of presumed neurological origin which selectively interferes with the
development, integration, and/or demonstration of verbal and/or nonverbal abilities. [It] exist[s]
as a distinct handicapping condition and varies in its manifestations and in degree of severity.
Throughout life, the condition can affect self esteem, education, vocation, socialization, and/or
daily living activities.
Id.
22. National Joint Committee on Learning Disabilities, National Joint Committee on Learning
Disabilities, at http://www.ldonline.org/njcld/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2005). The NJCLD was founded
in 1975 and is "a national committee of representatives of organizations committed to the education
and welfare of individuals with learning disabilities." Id. "Over 350,000 individuals constitute the
membership of the organizations represented by the NJCLD." Id. "A major purpose of the NJCLD is
to provide an interdisciplinary forum to review issues for educational and governmental agencies."
Id. "The NJCLD also prepares and disseminates statements to various organizations to clarify issues
in the area of learning disabilities." Id.
23. National Joint Committee on Learning Disabilities, Operationalizing the NJCLD Definition
of Learning Disabilities for Ongoing Assessment in Schools, at
http://www.ldonline.org/njcld/operationalizing.html (Feb. 1, 1997).
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specific skills, e.g., reading, relative to the level of proficiency expected based
on the individual's age, education, and intelligence. 24 They are seldom
diagnosed before kindergarten or first grade and tend to be identified on the
basis of performance differences on achievement tests and other ability-
oriented tests.25
B. Specific Learning Disabilities and Attention Disorders
The learning disabilities most frequently identified in disability
discrimination claims fall in the categories of specific learning disabilities and
attention disorders. 26 The current legal definition of a "specific learning
disability" was adopted by Congress through the Individual with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) Amendments for 199727 and its implementing
regulations. 28 The IDEA definition differs from the NJCLD definition in that
the former applies a "discrepancy model" 29 approach for determining a
learning disability.30 Critics of the discrepancy model approach believe that
for diagnostic purposes, it focuses too heavily on test scores and not on
underlying cognitive deficits that may be causing the learning difficulties. 31
The discussion of NCAA eligibility guidelines later in the paper will illustrate
24. AM PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(4th ed. 1994). Learning disabilities are referred to as "learning disorders" in the DSM-IV. Id at 49.
25. Robert J. Sternberg & Elena L. Grigorenko, Identity and Equality: Which Queue?, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 1928, 1930 (1999).
26. See, e.g., Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 957 F. Supp. 306 (D. Mass. 1997) (examining a
class complaint filed by Elizabeth Guckenberger on behalf of all learning disabled students at Boston
University); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791 (lst Cir. 1992) (requesting
accommodation for a medical student with dyslexia who wanted the multiple choice format of a
biochemistry test changed).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26) (2000). The IDEA was originally enacted in 1975 as the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1975), and was reauthorized by Congress as
the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (1997), to its current form.
28. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(10) (2004). The IDEA describes "specific learning disabilities" as "a
disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using
language, spoken or written, that may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read,
write, spell, or do mathematical calculations, including conditions as perceptual disabilities, brain
injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia.... The term does not
include learning problems that are primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor disabilities, of
mental retardation, of emotional disturbance, or of environmental, cultural, or economic
disadvantage." Id.
29. The formulas used for determining an educational discrepancy varies among the states
depending on local preferences and budgetary constraints; however, they all apply a requirement that
there be a gap between ability and performance in order for a student to qualify for educational
assistance.
30. ACCOMMODATIONS, supra note 13, at 133.
31. Id.
20051
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how the heavy emphasis on the Scholastic Assessment (formerly "Aptitude")
Test (SAT) or the American College Test (ACT) scores impact the learning
disabled athlete under this model. Nevertheless, "[p]roponents of the
discrepancy model [counter] that it serves the necessary purpose of separating
learning-disabled students from other poor performers." 32  "There is wide
disagreement [among the experts as to] how much of a [gap] between
achievement and aptitude is required to diagnose a learning disorder."33
Specific learning disabilities are "characterized as a 'neurobiological
condition' interfering with normal acquisition of language, speech, reading and
other cognitive skills." 34  Within this category, "[d]yslexia (difficulty with
reading) is the most common cognitive impairment that college students
report," although dyscalculia (difficulty with math) and dysgraphia (difficulty
with writing) are also reported. 35 Students affected by one of the specific
learning disabilities may not have impaired "higher-level cognitive
comprehension, such as understanding vocabulary, reasoning, forming
concepts[,] and general intelligence"; however, their difficulty in acquiring
basic information is often a source of confusion and distress.36 This can result
"in [their] need[ing]... longer periods of time to sort out and process
information." 37 Diagnosis of a specific learning disability usually is triggered
by the student's "performance on individually administered tests in reading,
mathematics, or writing [being] substantially below [his or her] capabilities.38
Attention disorders, the most common being Attention Deficit Disorder
(ADD) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), are marked by
"a persistent pattern of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that is
more frequent and more severe than is typically observed in individuals at a
comparable level of development. ' 39 "[N]either ADHD nor ADD causes
deficits in an individual's ability to acquire information" although ADHD may
32. Suzame Wilhelm, Accommodating Mental Disabilities in Higher Education: A Practical
Guide to ADA Requirements, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 217, 230 (2003).
33. Id. (citing Keith E. Stanovich, The Sociopsychometrics of Learning Disabilities, 32 J.
LEARNING DISABILITIES 350, 354 (1999)).
34. Patricia L. Bors, Academic Freedom Faces Learning Disabilities: Guckenberger v Boston
University, 25 J.C. & U.L. 581, 595-96 (1999).
35. Wilhelm, supra note 32, at 223.
36. Bors, supra note 34, at 596.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSN, supra note 24, at 51 The majority of mental health professionals
rely on the DSM-IV in diagnosing mental impairments; however, the United States Supreme Court
held in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), that an impairment need not appear in a list of
disorders to constitute a disability under the ADA. Id. at 633.
[Vol. 15:2
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indicate the person has a neurological problem. 40 Although the attention
disorders are seen significantly more often in males,4 1 a diagnosis requires
clinical evaluation, psychological testing, as well as behavioral reports from
parents, teachers, friends, and/or the individual being assessed.
4 2
Since individuals with learning disabilities generally exhibit
characteristics associated with normal age-specific behavior, health
professionals and educational institutions face a challenge to ensure that
students are not misrepresenting their impairments. "For example, the core
symptoms of ADHD are inattention and impulsiveness, both of which are
basic human characteristics." 43 Reading problems are frequently evidenced in
students with learning disabilities; however, many people suffer from reading
problems as a result of poor study skills or a lack of background knowledge.
Thus, being a poor reader does not automatically mean a person is learning
disabled.4
4
C. Challenges for the Student-Athlete with a Learning Disability
"[C]ritics have asserted that [learning disability] claims are... over-
medicalized, over-diagnosed deficiencies that collapse the distinction
between... truly 'disabled' students and those who are merely high-strung,
lazy, or 'faking it,' but nonetheless are entitled to a 'lifelong buffet of
accommodation perks."' 4 5 With the student-athlete, there can be the added
skepticism that the diagnosis is just a smokescreen to allow academically-
inferior gifted athletes the opportunity to play sports in highly ranked colleges
and universities. Recent allegations by current and former student athletes at
high-profile institutions such as Ohio State University describing academic
fraud and unwarranted learning disability accommodations reinforce the
skepticism about the legitimacy of college athletic programs.
46
40. Bors, supra note 34, at 596.
41. Pay Closer Attention: Boys Are Struggling Academically, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2004, at 12A
(noting that among school age children taking attention-deficit medication, boys constitute 80 percent
of the cohort).
42. Id.
43. Wilhelm, supra note 32, at 223.
44. Id.
45. Note, Toward Reasonable Equality: Accommodating Learning Disabilities Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Ill HARV. L. REv. 1560, 1563 (1998).
46. Tom Reed, Ohio State Will Be Probed by NCAA, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 14, 2004,
at F1 (noting former Ohio State University football player Maurice Clarett had accused the university
and coaching staff of committing academic fraud, supplying loaner cars, funneling players to deep-
pocket boosters, and aligning players with lucrative, no-show summer jobs). The article also reported
allegations by another former football player, B.J. Barre, who told ESPN Magazine that "he made
2005]
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These criticisms in some ways mirror the recent constitutional challenges
launched under race-based equal protection arguments related to the use of
affirmative action in the college admissions process. 47 As with affirmative
action, some critics of learning disability accommodation have suggested that
easing academic requirements merely rewards underachievers and weakens
academic standards.48 Recent trends showing a decline in the elementary and
secondary school academic performance of male students generally49 and
minority students specifically 50 suggest an anti-affirmative action argument
could soon begin to be seen in reference to student-athletes. Since school-age
African-American male children are statistically over-represented as special
education students compared to white students, 5' it thus follows that this
good money for little work, had tutors write papers for him and was placed, without his knowledge, in
a learning disabilities program that enabled him to take tests with assistance and under no time limit."
Id.
47. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (striking down an affirmative
action plan at the University of Texas law school and insisting that recent Supreme Court precedent
shows that diversity interest will not satisfy strict scrutiny); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 982 (2003)
(upholding the use of racial preferences for affirmative action on that ground that the practice was
narrowly tailored to produce diversity under an equal protection challenge to the admissions process
at the University of Michigan Law School); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating the
use of racial preferences for affirmative action on the ground that it involved too mechanical a
procedure for race consideration under an equal protection challenge to the undergraduate admissions
process at the University of Michigan).
48. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992). Ross attended the university
for four years on a basketball scholarship. Although functionally illiterate, he maintained his
eligibility for four basketball seasons. Id. See also Hall v. Univ. of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D.
Minn. 1982). An athlete accumulated more than ninety credit hours over three years that did not count
toward a degree. The athlete successfully sued when the university terminated his athletic eligibility
by denying him admission into a degree program. Id. See also CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL
BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES 142-143 (1996)
(discussing affirmative action compared to merit based principles).
49. Pay Closer Attention: Boys Are Struggling Academically, supra note 41, at 12A (noting that
the percentage of boys with learning disabilities is 12.5 percent compared to 6.6 percent of girls
andstating that an informal estimate from admissions directors indicates that three out of every four
private colleges quietly practice affirmative action for boys, favoring them over girls in admissions to
get near balance).
50. Id. (quoting Rod Paige, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education: "The good news is that
girls have narrowed or completely erased the educational learning gap with boys. Unfortunately,
boys now seem to be falling behind, and this is particularly a problem in minority communities. The
key is early support and intervention.").
51. Rosa A. Smith, Black Boys: The Litmus Test for "No Child Left Behind," EDUC. WEEK, Oct.
30, 2002, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2002 (citing a national analysis conducted
by the Boston Globe finding that 1.9 million girls compared to 3.8 million boys nationwide classified
as special education students); Lisa Fine, Disparate Measures, EDUC. WEEK, June 19, 2002,
available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2002 (noting that study after study has shown that
black male students are overrepresented in special education). Although the distinction is small
overall - 14 percent of black students compared to 12 percent of white children enrolled in special
610 [Vol. 15:2
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cohort will subsequently be more greatly impacted by these negative
perceptions due to their overrepresentation in the "big-time" 52 intercollegiate
athletics.
The increased scrutiny and skepticism associated with college athletics
from charges that it is driven by motives that exploit student-athletes have led
several authors to question the legitimacy of accommodating learning-disabled
students. 53 At least one author and one court have used the label "oxymoron"
in describing the "student-athlete" in major college sports.54 Since minority
athletes receive the majority of scholarships in some of the major sports at
education - the author indicated the disparity was much greater among students classified as having
mental retardation, a learning disability, or a behavioral/emotional disability. Id. See also Lisa Fine,
Graduation Rates Up for Special Education Students, Report Says, EDUC. WEEK, May 22, 2002,
available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2002 (discussing the trends identified in the
Department of Education's annual report to Congress on implementation of the IDEA identifying
"specific learning disabilities" as continuing to be the most prevalent, representing half the students
covered under the IDEA). The report also cited the continued overrepresentation of black students,
relative to their proportion of enrollment. Id. See also Civil Rights Project - Harvard University,
Racial Disparities in Special Education: National Trends, HARVARD.EDU, at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/resources/specialed/racial-disparities.pdf (2002) (citing
1998 data from the Department of Education indicating that black students, when compared to white
students, were 2.9 times more likely to be identified as having mental retardation; 1.9 times more
likely to be identified with an emotional problem; and 1.3 times more likely to be identified with a
specific learning disability).
52. Tanyon T. Lynch, Quid Pro Quo: Restoring Educational Primacy to College Basketball, 12
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 595 (2002) (stating that Division I-A football and Division I men's basketball
make up what is commonly referred to as "big time college sports"); see also Rodney K. Smith &
Robert D. Walker, From Inequity to Opportunity: Keeping the Promises Made to Big-time
Intercollegiate Student-athletes, 1 NEV. L.J. 160, 161 (2001) (referring to the major revenue-
producing sports of Division I-A football and Division I men's basketball as "big time" intercollegiate
athletics); see infra notes 171-74 for a discussion of the differences between the NCAA divisions.
53. See MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1998) (expressing skepticism of
the preferential treatment given individuals with learning disabilities and questioning whether the
accommodation system is just granting special legal privileges to those who have no unique moral,
psychological, or educational claim to them); Lee J. Rosen, Proposition 16 and the NCAA Initial-
eligibility Standards: Putting the Student Back in Student Athlete, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 175, 176
(2000) (stating big-time college athletic programs are a "training ground" where the student athlete is
heavily recruited to play sports and earn massive revenue for the school and alleging that athletes
often receive compensation against NCAA rules in the way of gifts, cars, cash payments, and "no-
show" jobs); Laura Pentimone, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Quest to Educate the
Student-athlete: Are the Academic Eligibility Requirements an Attempt to Foster Academic Integrity
or Merely to Promote Racism?, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 471 (1998); Kenneth L. Shropshire,
Colorblind Propositions: Race, the SAT, & the NCAA, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 141 (1997).
54. MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT VS. THE
UNIVERSITY 220 (1990). See also Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 802 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (stating "[i]f
the concept of a 'student athlete' is not to be an oxymoron, the NCAA's initial eligibility requirements
must be more than an afterthought or an administrative inconvenience for students, teachers, coaches,
and counselors").
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Division I schools while being minimally represented in the overall student
body, the scholarship award system becomes even more suspect.55 In an effort
to get the best athletes, colleges often admit at-risk students. Depending on a
variety of factors, this either leads, in the best case scenario, to an opportunity
for a young athlete to turn his or her life around or, in the worse case scenario,
opens a Pandora's box for the college when the athlete has problems inside and
outside of the classroom.56  Sadly, it is the negative perceptions from
recruiting scandals 57 and academic fraud 58 that can cause qualified learning
55. JBHE Weekly Bulletin, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 28, 2004 (on file with author) (citing
U.S. Department of Education statistic that black athletes receive 53.5 percent of football scholarships
at the 117 Division I colleges and universities); See NCAA, NCAA Graduation Rates Report Data, at
http://www.ncaa.org/grad_rates/2004 (last visited Apr. 9, 2005) (reporting undergraduate enrollment
data showing black males accounting for 2278 of the 3774 basketball and 8308 of the 15,659 football
athletic aid awards at Division I schools during the 2002-2003 school year and white males
accounting for 994 and 6135 athletic aid awards, respectively).
56. Vahe Gregorian, Net Gains, Net Losses, ST. Louis POST-DISPARCH, Nov. 7, 2004, at Fl.
(quoting Barry Hinson, Southwest Missouri State College coach, as stating, "If I'm a lawyer, all I
have to do is say, 'Your honor, United States - Olympic Games-I rest my case"' in relation to some
of the problems involving student athletes).
57. See, e.g., NCAA, Villanova University Placed on Probation for Violations in Men's
Basketball, at http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2004 (July 8, 2004) (reporting the basketball
program being placed on two years probation for multiple recruiting and extra benefit violations over
a two-year period from Fall 2001 to March 2003); NCAA, University of Oregon Placed on Probation
Through Summary Disposition for Violations in Football, at
http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2004 (June 23, 2004) (reporting that the football program
was placed on two years probation after the assistant coach had impermissible contact and accepted a
National Letter of Intent containing a forged parent's signature from a prospective student); NCAA,
Auburn University Placed on Probation for Violations in Men's Basketball, at
http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2004 (Apr. 27, 2004) (reporting that the basketball program
was placed on two years probation following impermissible basketball staff contacts, which included
attempts to develop a close relationship with the "team sponsor" of an amateur team and a "sports
agent" who were associated with a prospective high school student-athlete).
58. Gregorian, supra note 56, at F1 (citing the scandals peaking in college basketball involving
egregious academic fraud cases at the University of Georgia and St. Bonaventure College and a
murder and attempted cover-up at Baylor University that led the National Association of Basketball
Coaches to convene an emergency summit of Division I coaches); see, e.g., NCAA, University of
Georgia Placed on Probation for Violations in Men 's Basketball, at
http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2004 (Aug. 5, 2004) (reporting that the program was placed
on four years probation after an assistant basketball coach taught a basketball coaching class in which
all thirty-nine students enrolled were awarded a grade of "A"; three student-athletes enrolled in the
class rarely attended and did not take the required final exam); NCAA, California State University,
Northridge Placed on Probation for Violations in Men 's Basketball, at
http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2004 (Mar. 30, 2004) (reporting that the program was placed
on three years probation after the former assistant basketball coach knowingly arranged or attempted
to arrange for a former student-athlete to be enrolled in and receive course credit for two kinesiology
courses, even though the student-athlete never attended class or otherwise completed the course
requirements); NCAA, St. Bonaventure Placed on Probation for Violations in Men's Basketball, at
http://www.ncaa.org/releases/infractions/2004 (Feb. 19, 2004) (reporting that the program was placed
on three years probation after the institution changed a student-athlete's incomplete grade in a class to
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disabled student-athletes to face ongoing challenges to their credibility when
seeking a reasonable accommodation.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ADA AND APPLICATION TO THE
LEARNING DISABLED STUDENT-ATHLETE
A. Historical Overview and Purpose of the ADA
The disability rights movement is a relatively recent phenomenon in
American law. The impetus for the movement followed the 1954 landmark
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.5 9 Echoing concerns similar to those
identified in Brown, advocates related the rights of the disabled to those of
minorities being protected under the constitutional equal protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 60  As with Brown, the Fourteenth Amendment
ultimately proved to be the vehicle through which legislative protection from
disability discrimination, in addition to race-based discrimination, could be
achieved. 61
An individual with a learning disability is entitled to protection from
discrimination by two federal statutes: the Rehabilitation Act of 197362 and
the ADA. 63 The Rehabilitation Act was "[t]he first comprehensive piece of
remedial legislation passed by Congress [addressing the] rights [of] disabled
Americans." 64  It was "[i]nspired by the [unsuccessful] attempts of Senator
Hubert Humphrey to add disabilities as a protected class under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, ''65 and the statutory language is patterned after that
a withdrawal, kept the student-athlete from going into the university's academic restoration program,
and instead enabled him to remain eligible to travel to away games under university policy in the
spring semester of the 2002-2003 academic year).
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). This historic ruling commanded the racial desegregation of the nation's
public schools. The decision reversed the longstanding separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment states "[n]or shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. See Frances M. Nicastro, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: Determining Which Learning Disabilities Qualify for Reasonable Accommodation,
26 J. LEGIS. 355, 357 (2000).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l)-(2) (2000). In passing the ADA, Congress recognized that physical
or mental disabilities affect 43,000,000 Americans whom society had tended to isolate or segregate
because of their disabilities. Id.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).
64. W.S. Miller, Ganden v. NCAA: How the NCAA's Efforts to Clean Up It's Image Have
Created an Ethical and Legal Dilemma, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 465, 467 (1997).
65. Id; 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3a (1964).
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legislation. 66 Thus, the Rehabilitation Act, like other civil rights legislation of
that era, was only effective in prohibiting discrimination against persons with
disabilities by government agencies or businesses with federal contracts over
$2500.67
The second, and arguably more significant, piece of remedial legislation
passed by Congress involving the rights of the disabled was the ADA in
1990.68 The ADA was enacted by Congress "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." 69 The ADA built upon the foundation laid by
the Rehabilitation Act by both expanding the scope of the legislation and
expanding the coverage to prohibit private sector discrimination, including
private schools and universities.7 0 Upon signing the ADA, President George
H.W. Bush dismissed fears that the legislation would lead to "an explosion of
litigation."71 Contrary to his prediction, there has been a significant amount of
litigation since its inception concerning the reach of the ADA in various sports
settings. In the area of sports law alone, athletes have sought ADA protection
for a variety of disabilities including drug and alcohol use, 72 mobility 73 and
66. Miller, supra note 64, at 467.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
68. Miller, supra note 64, at 467.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994). In addition to the purpose quoted, Congress identified three
additional basic purposes for enacting the ADA:
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
§ 12101 (b)(2)-(4).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The ADA prohibits discrimination in all segments of
society, such as restaurants, museums, parks, sports facilities, theaters, shopping centers,
telecommunication services, private employment, housing, and transportation services. Id.
71. Ann M. Kearney, Not Like It Was in the Old Days: Is the Americans with Disabilities Act
Changing the Face of Sports as We Know It?, 10 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 153 (2003).
72. See, e.g., Associated Press, ADA Claim, cnnsi.com, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
football2002/playoffs/news/2002/0l/30/glennlawsuit ap/ (Jan. 30, 2002). Glenn claimed
discrimination based on his disability of chr6nic depression when he was suspended for four games
after missing a drug test in accordance with the NFL's substance abuse policy. Id. See also Stearns v.
Bd. of Educ., No. 99C5818, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17981 (N.D. 111. Nov. 16, 1999) (holding high
school student barred from participating in athletics after two alcohol-related incidents that violated
his school's athletic code of conduct did not violate ADA even though the student was diagnosed as
being an alcoholic following the incidents).
73. See, e.g., Kuketz v. MDC Fitness Corp., No. CIV. 98-0114-A, 2001 WL 993565 (Mass.
Super. Aug. 17, 2001) (rejecting a claim by a paraplegic racquetball player requesting to play against
non-paralyzed competitors with an allowance for two bounces, as opposed to the one bounce
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health impairments, 74 as well as learning disabilities. 75 There have also been
several challenges under the ADA to sports related age 76 and semester limit
restrictions, 77 usually involving high school athletics participation. Due to this
paper's focus on college athletes and the NCAA, references and analysis will
be made primarily to the ADA.
B. Definition of the ADA and Its Application to the Student-Athlete
A person is statutorily "disabled" under the ADA if the individual has,
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) [been] regarded as having such an impairment. ' 78 DOJ regulations further
describe disability with respect to an individual as encompassing "[a]ny
mental or psychological disorder such as ... specific learning disabilities. ' 79
While a student-athlete diagnosed with a specific learning disability meets the
requirement for a mental impairment, as previously noted, the legitimacy of
traditionally allowed). The court held the two-bounce request was a fundamental alteration to the
competitive nature of a racquetball competition and would give the plaintiff a competitive advantage
against his opponents. Id. at * 1.
74. See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). The PGA denied Martin's request
for disability accommodation to use a golf cart in the third round of a qualification tournament;
finding for Martin, the Supreme Court held that allowing Martin to use a golf cart, as opposed to
walking, would not "fundamentally alter the nature" of the PGA's Q-school and tournaments. Id. at
690. Martin suffers from a degenerative circulatory disorder, Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome,
which places him at great risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood clots, and fracturing his tibia if he
tried to walk an entire eighteen-hole golf course. Id. at 668.
75. See also Paul M. Anderson, A Cart That Accommodates: Using Case Law to Understand the
ADA, Sports, and Casey Martin, 1 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 211 (2002).
76. See, e.g., Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n., 913 F. Supp. 663, 671 (D. Conn.
1996) (holding that an age waiver allowing a nineteen-year-old high school student with Down's
Syndrome to participate as a scoring member of his high school's swim team was a reasonable
accommodation); compare with Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1033 (6th
Cir. 1995) (holding age limit on athletic eligibility did not exclude two students, who had fallen
behind the school grade for most students of their age group because of their learning disability,
solely based on their disability).
77. See, e.g., Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 181 F.3d 840 (1999) (ruling in favor
of a learning disabled basketball player and holding that allowing his sports eligibility in violation of
a strict interpretation of an eight-semester participation rule was a reasonable accommodation and
would not fundamentally alter the rule); Cruz v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 157 F. Supp. 2d
485 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that the athletic association had to implement process for an
individualized inquiry for age waivers to consider nineteen-year-old plaintiff who wanted to
participate in football and track); compare with McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119
F.3d 453, 459-63 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding state athletic association's eight-semester limitation for
participation did not violate the ADA).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
79. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(l)(i)(B) (2004).
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the diagnosis can be suspect and has been abused. Since cases involving
student-athletes are rarely filed under the second or third prong, only the first
prong will be discussed in detail in this review.
The term "substantially limits" means the inability to perform a major life
activity that the average person in the general population could perform or
being significantly restricted related to a condition, manner, or duration of
such performance when compared to the general population.80  The
regulations that interpret the ADA define major life activities as "functions
such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."81 Thus, a student-athlete
diagnosed with a specific learning disability is likely to be "disabled" within
the meaning of the ADA because a diagnosed learning disability limits one's
ability to learn through its impact on mental processes such as thinking and
concentrating, not because of any impact on his or her ability to participate in
organized sports.82 The impact in the learning disability context of the recent
Supreme Court Sutton trilogy decisions related to the consideration of
mitigating measures in a "substantial limitation" disability determination will
be discussed in Part III of this paper.
An individual who meets the ADA definition of "disabled" has only
crossed the first hurdle. To establish a prima facie ADA discrimination claim
as a "qualified individual with a disability, ' 83 a learning disabled student-
athlete must prove that, (1) he or she has a disability within the current
meaning of the statute; (2) he or she is "otherwise qualified" to obtain the
benefits being sought, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) an
adverse action was taken against him or her solely because of his or her
disability; and (4) the educational institution or other defendant falls under the
auspices of the Rehabilitation Act 84 or the ADA85 as a public entity (Title II
80. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii) (2004).
81. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(2) (2004); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2004); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2004). The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulations interpret Title I of the ADA; Department
of Justice regulations interpret Titles II and III.
82. EEOC, ADA EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL 902 (2d ed.1995). See, e.g., Knapp v.
Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that playing intercollegiate basketball
is not part of the major life activity of learning and, thus, plaintiff was not protected by the ADA).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (applying to educational institutions that have federal contracts or
receive federal financial assistance).
85. The ADA is divided into five titles. Title I prohibits discrimination in employment. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). Title II prohibits discrimination with respect to public services. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (2000). Title III deals with public accommodations and services operated by private entities.
42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000). Title IV covers telecommunications and directs the Federal
Communications Commission to ensure the availability of relay services to hearing and speech-
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claim) 86 or is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public
accommodation (Title III claim).87
C. Establishing Entitlement to Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA
The ADA provides entitlement to the "otherwise qualified" disabled
individual to protection against discrimination based on his or her disability.
The Act states that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis
of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation." 88 The Act further specifies that discrimination includes "a
failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures
when such modifications are necessary to afford the services to individuals
with disabilities."8 9
However, meeting the "otherwise qualified" test is usually the most
difficult for a learning disabled student-athlete because the individual has to
demonstrate that with or without accommodation, he or she can meet the
essential eligibility requirements of the college or the NCAA. 90 While the
student's disability must be taken into consideration for purposes of
determining admission to a program, the college or the NCAA is not required
to make modifications that lower academic standards or trigger fundamental
changes to the program.9 1 Allegations in athlete college admissions scandals
reflect that colleges do not always adhere to this criterion.92
The only acceptable defense the ADA offers for failing to comply is if an
''entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, or
impaired individuals. 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 711 (2000). Title V contains miscellaneous provisions. 42
U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (2000).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132(2000).
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7), 12182 (2000).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
90. See Susan M. Denbo, Disability Lessons in Higher Education: Accommodating Learning
Disabled Students and Student-Athletes Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 41 AM. Bus. L.J. 145, 149 (2003).
91. James Leonard, Judicial Deference to Academic Standards Under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Titles H1 and lII of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 75 NEB. L. REv. 27, 29
(1996).
92. See, e.g., Ross, 957 F.2d at 411. Ross accepted a scholarship to play basketball at Creighton
University despite scoring in the bottom fifth percentile on the ACT; the average freshman admitted
to the university scored in the upper 27th percentile. Reed, supra note 46, at Fl.
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accommodations." 93 Colleges and the NCAA in student-athlete discrimination
cases routinely offer this defense.
D. Enforcement of NCAA Initial Eligibility Rules as an Adverse Action
The majority of claims raised against the NCAA and its member colleges
and universities are launched by highly talented high school athletes,
oftentimes minority athletes in the revenue generating sports, who have been
recruited heavily by some of the top-ranked Division I colleges and
universities. In most instances, the rescission of a lucrative athletic
scholarship offer due to the student-athlete's inability to meet NCAA initial
eligibility criteria successfully triggers the adverse action prong of a prima
facie case filed under the ADA. The failure to meet NCAA eligibility criteria
is generally related to a low SAT or ACT score, an overall grade point average
(GPA) that is not high enough to compensate for the standardized test score,
and/or a high school academic transcript that reflects remedial coursework that
does not meet NCAA core curriculum requirements.
94
E. Public or Private: Title II vs. Title III Determinations in ADA Claims
Once a student-athlete has shown that he or she is disabled under the ADA
and unable to meet the academic program participation requirements because
of a learning disability, the student-athlete must also state whether under Title
II or Title III, he or she could be "otherwise qualified" to participate in the
educational or athletic program with or without a reasonable
accommodation. 95 The learning disabled student-athlete must next show that
he or she was excluded from participation in or denied the benefit of the
activities of the public entity (Title II claim);96 or denied the opportunity to
participate in or benefit from services or accommodations on the basis of a
disability and reasonable accommodations could be made that do not
fundamentally alter the nature of the defendant's (usually a private college,
university, or the NCAA) services or accommodations (Title III claim).
97
Since these two ADA titles are mutually exclusive, learning disabled student-
athletes seeking access to a college or university athletic program under the
ADA must declare whether the alleged offender is a public or private entity.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
94. Section IV provides a detailed discussion on NCAA eligibility criteria and the ADA.
95. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2004) (Title II); 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000) (Title Ill); see also Leonard,
supra note 91, at 29.
96. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2000).
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Title II of the ADA specifically prohibits public entities, including state
and local government-run institutions of higher education, from discriminating
against otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities when providing
benefits or services. 98 A public entity is defined as "(1) [a]ny State or local
government; (2) [a]ny department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or States or local government .... 99 To determine
if an entity falls under the ADA definition of a public entity, courts have
focused on the amount of authority delegated to the entity from the state. 10 0
Additionally, courts have considered whether athletic association members are
public schools, whether its members use public facilities, and whether an
athletic association can sanction public schools for violations of its rules.1 1
Under Title II, a "qualified individual with a disability" is a person who "with
or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, . . . or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or participation in programs or services
provided by a public entity.' 10 2
Title III was established to prevent discrimination "on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation."' 103 The DOJ regulations implementing Title
III define a "place of public accommodation" as a facility operated by a private
entity whose operations affect commerce and come within at least one of
twelve enumerated categories including nursery, elementary, secondary,
undergraduate, and post-graduate private schools, or other places of
education. 10 4 However, the plaintiff must prove that the private organization
operates a place of public accommodation. 105
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court held that the NCAA is not a
state actor,10 6 and lower courts have since rejected the assertion by the NCAA
that it is not within the reach of Title III by holding that it is a private entity
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12189 (2000).
99. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104.
100. Jonathan R. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act and It's Application to High School,
Collegiate, and Professional Athletics, 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 243, 247 (1999).
101. Id.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1994).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)0) (2000).
105. Christopher W. Lewis, Athletic Eligibility-Too High a Hurdle for the Learning Disabled, 15
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 75, 82 (1998).
106. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
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that operates a place of public accommodation. 107 Despite its seemingly
public status, the NCAA is a private entity because it "enjoy[s] no
governmental powers to facilitate its investigation. It ha[s] no power to
subpoena witnesses, to impose contempt sanctions, or to assert sovereign
authority over any individual." 10 8 Although the NCAA has protested the
designation, the DOJ and lower courts have held that the NCAA can be
challenged under Title III of the ADA.1 09
III. IMPACT OF THE SUTTON TRILOGY ON MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION INTERPRETATIONS
When the Supreme Court decided the Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,
110
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,1 ll and Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg12 cases on June 22, 1999, it refined the legislative answer to the
question, "What is a disability?"' '113 The decision resolved a circuit split as to
whether mitigating measures, such as medication or self-accommodations,
were to be taken into account in determining whether someone is currently
"substantially limited" under the ADA. 114 A brief review of the trilogy is
107. Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (denying NCAA's motion for summary judgment to dismiss
plaintiffs ADA claim); Tatum, 992 F. Supp at 1114 (finding that plaintiff has demonstrated that the
NCAA operates a place of public accommodation for purposes of Title III of the ADA); Butler, 1996
WL 1058233, at *5 (denying defendant's motion to dismiss on issue of whether Title III was
applicable); Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *10 (ruling on plaintiffs motion for a preliminary
injunction, the court found there was reasonable likelihood that the NCAA constitutes "a place of
public accommodation" within the meaning of Title III of the ADA).
108. Miller, supra note 64, at 474 (quoting Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 197).
109. See United States v. NCAA (D.D.C. May 27, 1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/ncaa.htm. In May 1998, the DOJ filed a civil action to enforce Title III
of the ADA against the NCAA; the NCAA entered into a Consent Decree with the DOJ but did not
waive its position that it is not a place of public accommodation and therefore Title III does not apply
to it. Id. See supra note 107.
110. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
111. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
112. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
113. See generally Richard C. Dunn, Determining the Intended Beneficiaries of the ADA in the
Aftermath of Sutton: Limiting the Application of the Disabling Corrections Corollary, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1265 (2002); Randal 1. Goldstein, Mental Illness in the Workplace After Sutton v.
United Air Lines, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 927 (2001); Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans
with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52
ALA. L. REv. 271 (2000); Wendy Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial
Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53 (2000).
114. Dunn, supra note 113, at 1273. Prior to the Sutton ruling, eight federal circuits had "adopted
the EEOC position whereby an individual's disability status was evaluated in his or her unmedicated
or uncorrected state"; only the Eighth and Tenth Circuits adopted the position that individuals should
be evaluated in their mitigated or corrected state. The Fourth Circuit had not ruled on this issue prior
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necessary before discussing the impact on individuals with learning
disabilities.
In Sutton, twin sisters with severe myopia (nearsightedness) filed suit
based on the airline's refusal to hire them as commercial pilots. 115 The airline
required pilots to have uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100.116 The Sutton
twins' vision, while 20/20 or better with corrective lenses, was 20/200 and
20/400 uncorrected in their right and left eyes, respectively."17  Despite
legislative history 118 and interpretive guidance from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 119 and DOJ 120 to the contrary, the Supreme
Court held that considering the availability of mitigating or corrective
to Sutton. Id. at 1273.
115. Sutton, 527 U.S. at471.
116. Id. at 476.
117. Id. at 475.
118. Id. at 500 (Stevens, J., dissenting (citing S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 89 (1989) as stating "[A]n
important goal of the third prong of the [disability] definition is to ensure that persons with medical
conditions that are under control, and that therefore do not currently limit major life activities, are not
discriminated against on the basis of their medical conditions")). Stevens also cited a Report of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, which stated when an individual's impairment substantially limits
a major life activity, "[t]he impairment should be assessed without considering whether mitigating
measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in a less-than-
substantial limitation." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 52 (1990). See also Sicard v. Sioux City, 950 F.
Supp. 1420, 1437-38 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (setting out the legislative history of the ADA). The Supreme
Court, however, refused to consider this legislative history because it found it contrary to the statutory
language. Id.
119. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting (citing 29 C.F.R. 1630.20) (1998)). Title I
Interpretive Guidance provides that "[tihe determination of whether an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assistive prosthetic devices." Id. However, an individual who is
unable to read because of dyslexia would be an individual with a disability, because dyslexia, a
learning disability is an impairment. Id. But compare Sutton, 527 U.S. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting
(referencing EEOC interpretive guidance).
120. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2003). Title II interpretive guidance states "[t]he question of whether a
person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures,
such as reasonable modification or auxiliary aids and services." Id. See also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479.
In the Supreme Court majority's view, neither the EEOC nor the DOJ was given authority to issue
regulations defining disability. Id. Justice O'Connor came to this controversial statutory
interpretation and elected not to give deference to the EEOC and DOJ interpretive guidelines which
expressly indicated that mitigating measures were not to be taken into consideration in determining
the existence of a disability. Id. at 482. Reflecting a detailed statutory analysis, Justice O'Connor
wrote "[n]o agency... has been given authority to issue regulations implementing the generally
applicable provisions of the ADA, see §§ 12101 - 12102, which fall outside Titles I-V. Most notably,
no agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term 'disability."' Id. at 479 (citing §
12102(2)). The agencies only had been granted statutory authority to issue regulations related to
specifically enumerated subchapters. Id. The majority elected to rely on that routinely overlooked
distinction in holding that there was no need to decide whether to give deference to the agencies'
interpretive guidelines. Id. at 479-80.
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measures was required in determining whether certain impairments are
"substantially limiting."'121 Therefore, because the use of corrective lenses
mitigated their impairment under the major life activity of seeing, the Sutton
twins were not substantially limited by their myopia, and thus, were not
disabled under the ADA.
The Supreme Court relied on the Sutton rationale for its holdings in the
other two cases. In Murphy, the question presented involved a mechanic/truck
driver who was dismissed from his job with the United Postal Service because
he had hypertension (high blood pressure). 122 At issue was a Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulation requiring drivers of commercial vehicles to
be free of high blood pressure. 123 The Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's
finding that the determination of whether an employee had a disability should
be made with regard to his use of medication. 124 The Court held that the
petitioner was not disabled under the ADA because, in its medicated state,
Murphy's hypertension was controlled and he functioned normally in everyday
activities. 125
The Supreme Court reiterated the theme of Sutton and Murphy in the final
ruling of the trilogy in Albertson's. The Albertson's case also involved a
commercial truck driver, Kirkingburg, who could not meet DOT visual acuity
standards due to monocular vision from amblyopia (an uncorrectable condition
that left him with 20/200 vision in his left eye). 126 Finding for the employer,
the Court used the Ninth Circuit's acknowledgment that Kirkingburg's "brain
has developed subconscious mechanisms for coping with [his] visual
impairment and thus his body compensates for his disability" to reverse the
lower court's findings in his favor. 127  The Court held that it saw "no
principled basis for distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial
aids, like medications and devices, and measures undertaken, whether
consciously or not, with the body's own systems," and thus Kirkingburg was
not disabled under the ADA. 128
The central holding of the Sutton trilogy is that "the determination of
whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures
121. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
122. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 516.
123. Id. (referencing 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(6) (1997)). The. DOT health certification
requirement includes having "no current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure likely to interfere
with his/her ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely." 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(6).
124. Id. at 525.
125. Id. at 523.
126. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 559.
127. Id. at 565 (citing Albertson's, 143 F.3d at 1232).
128. Id. at 565-66.
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that mitigate the individual's impairment."' 129 Since there are no artificial aids
that can assist the learning disabled, the critical question for learning disabled
individuals is whether "the body's own systems"'130 include cognitive
adaptations used by individuals to help them understand, read, and learn
productively. 131 Two qualities differentiate learning disabilities from physical
disabilities -namely, the difficulty in objectively defining exactly what a
learning disability is and determining ways to gauge learning disabilities not
treated, e.g., with medications or educational interventions, in an unmitigated
state.132  Because learning disabilities are inherently different from the
physical disabilities in the Sutton trilogy cases, it may be inappropriate to
transfer their application to the learning disabled student or student-athlete.
The type of mitigating factors a court would have to consider in evaluating a
learning disabled student-athlete would have to include measures the
individual has taken to enhance his or her ability in spite of an impairment.
133
Such cognitive coping mechanisms should be viewed as accomplishments
synthesized into the individual's learning ability rather than removing
incentives for higher achievement by considering it a "mitigating self-
accommodation." 34
Recent actions by circuit courts and inactions by the Supreme Court
around the period of the Sutton rulings suggest a default acceptance of self-
accommodations, such as studying harder, as mitigating measures to preclude
a finding of discrimination for college students with learning disabilities.135 In
two pre-Sutton cases, Price v. National Board of Medical Examiners136 and
129. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. See also Brian East, The Definition of Disability After Sutton Vs.
United Airlines, available at http://www.nls.org/conf2000/brineast.htm (2000) (summarizing the
Court's holding as, (1) "the ADA's definition of disability as an impairment that 'substantially limits' a
major life activity uses the 'present indicative verb form,' and does not speak in terms like 'might,'
'could,' or 'would;' [(2)] judging people in their uncorrected or unmitigated state would be contrary to
the ADA's requirement of an individual assessment, because it would require speculation about a
person's condition without the mitigating measures, and would thus have to be based on generalized
information; [(3)] judging people in their uncorrected or unmitigated state could mean that negative
side effects from mitigating measures may not be considered, leading to an unfair result; [and (4)]...
Congress' finding that there are 'some 43,000,000 Americans' with disabilities was based on studies
reflecting functional impairments of persons even when using special aids, and would have been a
much larger number if corrected impairments were included").
130. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565-66.
131. Nicastro, supra note 60, at 369.
132. Id. at 370.
133. Id. at 371.
134. Id.
135. Krueger, supra note 16, at 630.
136. 966 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).
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McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine,137 the courts
held that mitigating factors and self-accommodations precluded findings of
disability. The Price court, using a "comparison to most people approach,"
held that three medical students with learning disabilities seeking additional
time and a separate room to take the mandatory Step 1 of the United States
Medical Licensing Examination (hereinafter "Step 1 Exam") 138 were not
substantially limited in the major life activity of learning because they
demonstrated a history of significant scholastic achievement. 139 In other
words, because they had self-mitigated the effects of their impairment, they
were not held to be disabled.
The McGuinness court cited the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Sutton140 to hold
that a medical student whose anxiety disorder affected his ability to take
chemistry and mathematics exams was not substantially limited in the major
life activity of "academic functioning" because he was able to mitigate the
problem by altering his study habits. 14' The Supreme Court subsequently
refused to review McGuinness after the Sutton trilogy rulings. 142  It is
speculative at this point, but college students whose conditions are controlled
by medication or mitigated through hard work and diligence could find
themselves outside of the ADA's protection.143 In an analogous ruling, at least
two courts have rejected mentally ill individuals' claims after Sutton because
their medications and counseling allow them to "function without
limitation."'144
In a post-Sutton case involving a medical student, Gonzales v. National
Board of Medical Examiners, 145 the Sixth Circuit denied a request for double
time to take the "Step 1 Exam" to accommodate a learning disability
diagnosed as a reading disorder and disorder of written expression. 146
137. 170 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1998).
138. Price, 966 F. Supp. at 422 The examination is administered by the National Board of
Medical Examiners, an organization subject to Title III of the ADA. The exam is given after
completion of the second year of medical school and a passing grade is necessary to start the third
year of the medical school curriculum.
139. Id. at 427-28.
140. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 130 F. 3d 893, 900 (10th Cir. 1997).
141. McGuinness, 170 F.3d at 978.
142. 170 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1051 (1999).
143. Wilhelm, supra note 32, at 232.
144. Goldstein, supra note 113, at 950 (citing Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 186 F. 3d 897
(8th Cir. 1999) and Robb v. Horizon Credit Union, 66 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 1999), but noting
that if the use of medication is only mildly effective or causes disabling side effects, the individual
might still be considered substantially limited in a major life activity).
145. 60 F. Supp. 2d 703 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
146. Id. at 710.
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Gonzales's psychologist testified that he "compared plaintiffs performance to
fourth year college students and found that some of his scores were below
average to impaired."' 147 Citing Sutton 148 and Price,14 9 the court held that
Gonzales's impairment did not meet the "substantially limiting" definition
because when compared with "most people,"'150 he was not disabled as his
scores were in the average to superior range.151
Shortly after the Sutton trilogy was decided, the Supreme Court vacated
the judgment and remanded back to the Second Circuit another learning
disability case, New York State Board of Law Examiners v. Bartlett,152 for
reconsideration in light of Sutton and its progeny. Bartlett sought extra time
on the bar examination to compensate for a learning disability that
"significantly restrict[ed] her ability to identify timely and decode the written
word."' 153 Prior to the Sutton rulings, the Second Circuit had agreed with the
plaintiff and the DOJ as amicus curiae that a person's ability to self-
accommodate did not foreclose a finding of disability. 154 On subsequent
review, the Bartlett court identified Gonzales as advancing the proposition that
being limited in some areas may not be enough to justify a finding that a
learning impairment is a disability. 15
5
The early effects of interpretations from the Sutton rulings on litigation
involving learning disabled student-athletes will be discussed in Section V of
this paper.
147. Id. at 707.
148. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-87.
149. Price, 966 F. Supp. at 425.
150. Gonzales, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 708 (citing Price, 966 F. Supp. at 425 as defining "most people"
as "the average person in the general population").
151. Id. Defendant's expert testified Gonzales's "verbal IQ [was] 100, 'squarely in the average
range'; [h]is performance IQ was 121, in the high average to superior range[;] and his Full Scale IQ
[at] 109 [was] well within the average range." Id.




155. See Bartlett v. N. Y. State Bd.of Law Examiners, 226 F. 3d 69, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2000) On
remand, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff may be disabled if her reading skills were below
average "to an extent that her ability to read is substantially limited." Id. at 74. Because the district
court had initially held that Bartlett was not disabled based on her "roughly average reading skills (on
some measures) when compared to the general population," the Second Circuit remanded the case for
further consideration as to whether Bartlett's skills on other measures were below average to such an
extent as to be substantially limiting when compared to most people. Id. at 77 (quoting Bartlett v.
N.Y. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
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IV. THE DISSONANCE BETWEEN THE NCAA, INTERCOLLEGIATE
INSTITUTIONS, AND STUDENT-ATHLETES
A. An Overview of the NCAA and the Learning Disabled Student-Athlete
The NCAA is a private, unincorporated association now comprised of
over 1250 public and private colleges and universities 156 that serves as the
rule-making body overseeing the nation's collegiate athletic programs. 15
7
Despite its voluntary nature, the NCAA is the leading regulatory body for
intercollegiate athletics. 158  The NCAA establishes and regulates rules
concerning, inter alia, recruiting of student-athletes, awarding of athletic
scholarships, and determining eligibility of more than 350,000 student-
athletes1 59 who participate in intercollegiate athletics at member schools. 160
The NCAA's principle of institutional control requires university presidents to
assume ultimate responsibility for athletics programs; however, this is usually
delegated to the institution's athletics director. 161
The NCAA identifies one of its primary purposes as being "[t]o encourage
its members to adopt eligibility rules to comply with satisfactory standards of
scholarship, sportsmanship, and amateurism."' 162 This description reflects the
two bedrock characteristics most recently reinforced by the Supreme Court's
1984 ruling in NCAA v. Board of Regents 63 that athletes must be amateurs
156. See NCAA, Composition of the NCAA, at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/
membershipsvcs/membership_breakdown.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
157. NCAA, 2003-2004 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION DIVISION I MANUAL
§ 4.02.1 (2003).
158. Lynch, supra note 52, at 599.
159. See NCAA, supra note 156. As of September 1, 2004, the NCAA identified the approximate
number of student-athletes as 210,989 men and 150,186 women for a total of 361,175 participants. Id.
160. NCAA, supra note 157, § 3.01.
161. Lynch, supra note 52, at 598. The athletic director usually "reports to either the university
president or a vice president. Coaches and administrative staff in the athletics department report to
the athletics director whose daily responsibilities may include revenue generation, managing
facilities, media relations, and academic affairs." Id.
162. NCAA, supra note 157, § 1.2(c); See also id. § 1.3.1 (stating a basic purpose of the NCAA
being "to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the
athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports").
163. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). In ruling against the NCAA in an antitrust case concerning a challenged
plan related to televised intercollegiate football games, the majority stated "[t]he NCAA plays a
critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.... the
preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate
athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act" Id. at 120.
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and students. 164 These eligibility expectations are now explicitly set forth in
the NCAA Bylaws stating, "[a]n institution shall not permit a student-athlete
to represent it in intercollegiate athletics competition unless the student-athlete
meets all applicable eligibility requirements."'165  Despite its frequently
articulated commitment to amateurism and education, the NCAA is often
accused of allowing commercialism, 166  professionalism, 167  competitive
pressure to win games, 168 and an "arms race"'169 of building and spending to
164. See also NCAA, supra note 157, §§ 12 - 14: All eligibility rules in Articles 12 through 14 of
the NCAA Bylaws relate exclusively to these two characteristics of student and amateur status. Id.
165. Id. § 14.01.1.
166. See Nygren, supra note 9, at 360. "In 1995, the NCAA began an eight-year $1.725 billion
contract to televise the men's basketball tournament on CBS. The NCAA and CBS subsequently
negotiated an eleven-year, $6 billion contract extension beginning in 2003." Id. See also Timothy
Davis, African-American Student-Athletes: Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory Structure, 6 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 199, 214-15 (1996) (noting that several successful college athletic programs had entered
into multi-million dollar deals with major apparel manufacturers such as Nike and Reebok; under the
contract, the company logo will appear on team jerseys, shoes, wristbands, and gloves of football
players, as well as on clothing and hats worn by coaching staff).
167. See Lynch, supra note 52, at 609 (noting that college athletics programs have become
training grounds for professional sports careers and that some athletes attend college for that sole
purpose); see also Harry Edwards, The End of the "Golden Age" of Black Sports Participation?, 38
S. TEX. L. REV. 1007, 1019 (1997) (citing statistics that a black high school football player has only a
t in 43 chance of playing for a Division I-A football team and his chances of playing in the NFL are
only I in 6,318; a black male has a 1 in 130 chance of playing for a Division I basketball team and
only a I in 10,345 chance of playing in the NBA). Robert M. Sellers, Black Student Athletes: Reaping
the Benefits or Recovering From the Exploitation, in RACISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS (D. Brooks &
R. Althouse, eds., 1993).
168. See, e.g., Phil Taylor, Irish Wake, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec.13, 2004, at 20 (discussing
the controversial firing of football coach, Tyrone Willingham, after just three seasons stating, ".... the
firing of Willingham sullied the school's image as an exemplary program with higher goals than just a
major bowl game"); Press Release, Knight Foundation, Knight Commission on Intercollegiate
Athletics Calls for Clearer Model of Division I-A Football Governance (May 24, 2004), available at
http://www.knightfdn.org/default.asp?story-/news%5Fat%5Fknight/releases/2004/2004%5F05%5F2
4%5Fkcia.html (discussing testimony to the Commission from former college football coaches
lamenting that coaches are evaluated solely on wins and losses and that the current emphasis on
winning is inconsistent with the role of athletics as an integral part of the educational process); see
infra note 234 for a general description of the Knight Commission and its role in intercollegiate
athletics.
169. KNIGHT FOUND. COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, A CALL TO ACTION:
RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION (2001), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/databasesiknight-commission/200lreport (noting in the seven years prior to
their report, capital expenditures, such as construction or remodeling of athletic facilities and capital
equipment, for stadiums and arenas to generate more money for colleges/universities had increased
250 percent). The report also cited the escalating salaries of "star" college football and men's
basketball coaches (reporting thirty coaches being paid $1,000,000 a year or more) as further
evidence of the arms race run amok. Id. By comparison, the report noted that the average salary of
fully tenured professors at U.S. public research institutions barely exceeded $84,000. Id.
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lead to the subordination of its educational mission. 170
The NCAA has divided its member colleges into three primary sections;
namely, Division 1,171 Division 11,172 and Division II1171 for purposes of
ensuring equity in defining which schools will compete against one another. 174
Although each division must comply with NCAA rules and regulations, the
rules governing the process for academic eligibility for entering freshmen at
Division I and II schools are the most controversial, especially for student-
athletes with a disability. 175
"[A]pproximately 1500 student-athletes with learning disabilities seek
certification of academic eligibility from the NCAA [every school year, and
approximately] two-thirds receive it."' 176  "By comparison, [out] of
approximately 140,000 non-disabled student-athletes who petition the NCAA,
six out of seven receive eligibility certification."'177 It is also estimated that of
the roughly "20,500 high school students [who] fail to attain 'qualifier' status
170. Id; see also Lori Shontz, Brand Addresses NCAA Challenges, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Jan. 9, 2005, at E5 Myles Brand, NCAA President, in his annual address at the NCAA Convention
devoted his speech to debunking what he said were four myths about colleges sports; namely, 1)
college sports is only about the money; 2) the demise of amateurism; 3) that college sports are "more
about sports than college"; and 4) the idea that Brand, rather than the college and university
presidents, was capable of making the needed changes. Lynch, supra note 52, at 600.
171. NCAA, What's the Difference Between Divisions 1, II, and III?, at
http://www.ncaa.org/about/div-criteria.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2005). There are 326 Division I
programs; Division I is further subdivided into I-A and I-AA (Ivy League) for football. Id. Division I
member institutions have to sponsor at least seven sports for men and seven sports for women (or six
for men and eight for women) with two team sports for each gender. Id. Division I schools must
meet minimum financial aid awards for their athletics program, and there are maximum financial aid
awards for each sport that a Division I school cannot exceed. Id.
172. Id. Division II member institutions have to sponsor at least four sports for men and four for
women, with two team sports for each gender, and each playing season represented by each gender.
Id. There are maximum financial aid awards for each sport that a Division II school must not exceed.
Id Many Division II student-athletes pay for school through a combination of scholarship money,
grants, student loans, and employment earnings. Id.
173. Id. Division III member institutions have to sponsor at least five sports for men and five for
women, with two team sports for each gender, and each playing season represented by each gender.
Id. Division III student-athletes receive no financial aid related to their athletic ability. Id.
174. NCAA, supra note 157, § 3.2.1.4. The divisions are based on, inter alia, "the scope of the
athletic program, the level of competition, and the amount of financial aid distributed through its
athletic program." Id.
175. Id. § 14.1.2.1. A student's initial eligibility status determines, inter alia, whether and when
they may compete in intercollegiate athletics; whether, when, and with whom he or she may practice
or engage in conditioning; and whether and from what sources of funds a student may receive
institutional financial aid or an athletic scholarship. Id.
176. Maureen A. Weston, Academic Standards or Discriminatory Hoops? Learning-disabled




PLA YING THE GAME OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY
and are [thus] ineligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics, [only] 500
[of them] are learning disabled."' 178 Freshmen students who meet eligibility
criteria are required to enroll in a full-time course of study, maintain good
academic standing, and make satisfactory progress toward a baccalaureate (or
equivalent) degree.179 Although these numbers reflect only a small percentage
of student-athletes, the statutory power of the ADA has had a significant
impact on NCAA operations over the last decade.
The NCAA rules view the term "student-athlete" as a substantive, rather
than formalistic, one. 180 Prior to admission for a course of study, a student-
athlete must be considered for initial eligibility. Initial eligibility consists of a
determination of amateur status, as well as a review of the student-athlete's
academic background to ensure that the student is capable of college work
based on objective standards. 181 To maintain eligibility as a student-athlete, a
student must "be enrolled in at least a minimum full-time program of studies,
be in good academic standing and maintain satisfactory progress toward a
baccalaureate or equivalent degree."' 182 These requirements, while benign on
their face, can be difficult to attain for athletes with and without learning
disabilities who are trying to balance academic demands and athletic
commitments.
NCAA rules allow athletic departments to exert substantial influence over
the student-athlete's academic priorities based on the coach's power to control
playing time in a sport and withdraw athletic scholarships. 183 Often, this
forces the student-athlete to choose between athletic success and academic
success. 184  NCAA rules limit an athlete's participation in "countable
athletically related activities" '185 to four hours per day and twenty hours per
week. 186 However, many student-athletes report that the "voluntary workout"
178. Id. at 1077 n. 157 (citing Naftali Bendavid & Bob Sakamoto, Enabling Legislation for
Learning-disabledAthletes, CHI. TRIB., May 27, 1998, at N1).
179. NCAA, supra note 157, § 14.1.7.1, 14.1.8.2.2. Full-time status is considered not less than
twelve semester or quarter hours, regardless of the institutions definition of a minimum full-time
program of studies. Id.
180. Alfred Dennis Mathewson, The Eligibility Paradox, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 83, 103
(2000).
181. Id. at 104.
182. Id. at 103 (citing NCAA, supra note 157, § 14.01.2.).
183. Lynch, supra note 52, at 604.
184. Id.
185. NCAA, supra note 157, § 17.02.1. Countable athletic activities include any on-court
activity, chalk talk, strategy discussions, watching game films, and weight training. Id.
186. Id. § 17.1.5.1.
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exception 187 is a major loophole for that restriction. 188 Some athletes spend
forty to sixty hours per week on their sport, which limits the amount of time
left for studying and attending classes. 189 In addition, they are required to
participate in athletically related social activities, such as booster functions,
that divert even more time away from studying. 190 Although most colleges
have comprehensive academic support and tutorial services available for
student-athletes, many are designed solely to maintain eligibility rather than to
assist the individual with a substandard academic preparation or a learning
disability to compensate for his or her deficits. 1
91
B. Before the NCAA: The Beginning of Collegiate Sports
A short discussion on the evolution of collegiate sports will place the
current collision with student-athletes and the NCAA under the ADA in
context. There have been concerns about athlete eligibility and
commercialism since the beginning days of intercollegiate athletics. One of
the earliest reported athletic events was a boat race between Harvard and Yale
universities in the 1840s that was organized and sponsored by the then
powerful Elkins Railroad Line. 192 It has been reported that this event "was
characterized by commercialization, crowds of spectators, prize money, and an
eligibility question" regarding one of the coxswains. 1
93
By the end of the nineteenth century, the leading university presidents
were already expressing concerns about the direction of intercollegiate sports.
President Francis Walker, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
187. Id. § 17.02.1(h). Coaches may design general voluntary individual workout programs for
student-athletes, and the workouts do not count as countable athletically related activities. Id.
Strength and conditioning coaches may also conduct voluntary workout programs, and the workouts
would not be considered countable athletically related activities. Id. § 17.02.1(1).
188. Lynch, supra note 52, at 604.
189. Id.
190. Timothy Davis, Examining Educational Malpractice Jurisprudence: Should a Cause of
Action Be Created for Student-Athletes?, 69 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 93 (1992).
191. See KNIGHT FOUND. COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 169 (noting
NCAA case books clearly reveal multiple infractions stemming from "tutoring" involving completing
athletes' assignments, writing their papers, and pressuring professors for higher grades).
192. Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association's Role in
Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 9 (2000) [hereinafter, Regulating
Intercollegiate Athletics]; Rodney K. Smith, Little Ado About Something: Playing Games with the
Reform of Big-time Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 567 (1991) [hereinafter, Little Ado];
see also Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Death Penalty: How
Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 989 (1986) [hereinafter, Death Penalty].
193. Little Ado, supra note 192, at 569-70. It is reported that in its zeal to win its first
intercollegiate event, Harvard University obtained the services of a coxswain who was not currently
enrolled at the university. Id.
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opined that "[i]f the movement shall continue at the same rate, it will soon be
fairly a question whether the letters B.A. stand more for Bachelor of Arts or
Bachelor of Athletics."' 194 In a scenario that seems incomprehensible today,
"[i]n 1903, the registrar at the University of Nebraska refused to admit a
talented young baseball player[;] two weeks later, the University Chancellor
enrolled him in the law school."' 195
It was societal concerns about the safety and violence associated with
collegiate sports, primarily football, 196 rather than academic integrity and
commercialism issues that ultimately led to the formation of the NCAA. In
1905, after 18 young men died and 149 were injured playing sports, President
Theodore Roosevelt was compelled to weigh in on this politically sensitive
issue and met with representatives from several prestigious universities.1 97
This solicitation ultimately led to a combined effort to reform intercollegiate
football rules. In December of that year, the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association of the United States was formed. 198 In 1910, it was officially
renamed the NCAA. 199 Although the organization was initially only a
rulemaking body, it was nevertheless organized to eliminate "unsavory
violence" and "preserve amateurism." 200
C. The NCAA: The First Fifty Years
Throughout its history, the NCAA has attempted to reverse the tendency
of colleges and universities to recruit students with athletic skills but who do
not have the skills to compete academically. 201 The NCAA's efforts to
194. Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 192, at 11 (noting that President Eliot of
Harvard University held that "lofty gate receipts from college athletics had turned amateur contests
into major commercial spectacles").
195. Little Ado, supra note 192, at 570-71.
196. JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND
EDUCATIONAL VALUES 7 (2001) (describing how the game took on a brutal tone, driven by plays
such as the Harvard-invented "flying wedge," in which what would be the equivalent of today's
offensive line started twenty-five yards behind the line of scrimmage and ran en masse into (or over)
one designated (and stationary) member of the opposing team).
197. Id.; see also Kay Hawes, Roosevelt's Love of Sport Led to NCAA's Birth, THE NCAA NEWS,
Nov. 8, 1999, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991108/active/3623n28.html. In
October 1905, President Roosevelt summoned the presidents and football coaches from Harvard,
Yale, and Princeton to the White House to discuss making football less dangerous and, ultimately,
saving the sport. Id.
198. Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 192, at 12. The IAAUS was formed with
sixty-two original members. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Nathan Hunt, Cureton v. NCAA: Fumble! The Flawed Use of Proposition 16 by the NCAA,
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increase academic performance initially targeted so-called "tramp" athletes in
the early 1900s. 202 Although the NCAA tried to combat this problem by
requiring evidence of student progress toward a degree, the requirement had a
negligible impact because colleges and universities retained the authority to
determine academic eligibility requirements for their athletes.
20 3
The NCAA was not a major force in the governance of intercollegiate
athletics in its early years because until after World War I, the running of
intercollegiate athletic events was primarily the responsibility of the students
at the college or university. 20 4 After World War II, college athletics faced a
series of major gambling scandals. 20 5 The NCAA took advantage of this
turmoil to implement policies that ultimately allowed it greater control over
rapidly expanding collegiate athletic programs.
20 6
In 1948, the NCAA enacted what has come to be known as the "Sanity
Code," which was designed to "alleviate the proliferation of exploitive
practices in the recruitment of student-athletes." 20 7 While one of the mandates
of this rule was to ban all athletic scholarships, colleges and universities
evaded the reforms by giving athletes secret scholarships or paying them
directly.20 8 After recognizing that its attempt to enforce the regulation was
futile, the NCAA repealed the "Sanity Code" in 195 1.209
The NCAA had two significant events occur during the 1950s that have
had a lasting effect on the organization. In 1951, the NCAA began to function
as a wholly separate organization and negotiated its first contract, valued at
over one million dollars, to televise intercollegiate football. 210 The financial
support provided by its share of the television contracts and its increasingly
forceful role in infractions matters allowed the NCAA to begin to establish its
place as the dominant entity in the governance of intercollegiate athletics that
it maintains today.211
31 U. TOL. L. REv. 273,278 (2000)
202. Id. "Tramp" athletes would participate in athletic programs at several different schools
during their collegiate career in exchange for financial compensation. Id.
203. Id.
204. Death Penalty, supra note 192, at 991.
205. Id. at 992.
206. Id.
207. Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 192, at 14.
208. Hunt, supra note 201, at 278.
209. Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 192, at 15.
210. Death Penalty, supra note 192, at 993.
211. Id.
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D. The Contemporary Role of the NCAA (1965 - Present): The Entry of
Standardized Tests, Academic Eligibility Requirements, and Legal Challenges
The NCAA has spent the last fifty years continuing to try to create a
legitimate system of minimum academic eligibility entry standards for
collegiate athletes. Well before the ADA was available as a legal forum, the
NCAA had to address student and collegiate challenges related to eligibility
rules. Following the failure of the "Sanity Code," the NCAA resumed a
"home rule" method of regulating academic standards for incoming student-
athletes. Under the "home rule" policy, the member schools enacted their own
admission policies for college athletes and set their own eligibility
standards.2 12 In 1965, the NCAA attempted to rectify the failure of the
"Sanity Code" with the passage of "1.600 Rule." '2 13 The 1.600 Rule required
students to have a high school record and standardized test scores sufficient to
"predict" a college grade point average of at least 1.6 (i.e., in the C-/D+
range). 214 Although the requirements under the 1.600 Rule were modest, it
still led to controversy and litigation because of the consideration of
standardized test scores. While not realized at the time, this was actually the
first NCAA policy that would have impacted a student-athlete with a learning
disability.
By the 1970s, the NCAA found itself caught in the crossfire of criticism
from its member colleges and universities and American society.2 15 On the
one hand, the colleges criticized it for unfairly exercising regulatory
authority. 2 16 This criticism peaked when the NCAA was given additional
power beginning in 1976 to penalize schools directly and, therefore,
administrators, coaches, and student-athletes indirectly for rule violations. 2 17
On the other hand, the issue of academic integrity in intercollegiate athletics
resurfaced by assertions that it had been commercialized to the point that it
was little more than a big business masquerading as an educational
enterprise.218
The first lawsuits challenging NCAA academic eligibility requirements
were filed in 1973.219 In Begley v. Corporation of Mercer University,220 a
212. Shropshire, supra note 53, at 143.
213. Hunt, supra note 201, at 278.
214. Shropshire, supra note 53, at 143. The prediction was made using a formula considering
high school grades or high school rank, along with the student's score on the SAT or ACT. Id
215. Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 192, at 16.
216. Death Penalty, supra note 192, at 994.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Hunt, supra note 201, at 283.
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high school basketball star unable to meet the 1.600 rule requirements
unsuccessfully filed suit under breach of contract when the university revoked
his scholarship. 221  In the same year, a different court held that NCAA
eligibility rules had a rational relationship to the legitimate state purpose of
educating student athletes and therefore dismissed a Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause 222 in Parish v.
NCAA. 223 The Parish court also decided that, consistent with an analogous
Supreme Court constitutional ruling,224 there was not a fundamental right to
participate in collegiate athletics.225 Although the NCAA prevailed in these
initial legal challenges, it dropped the 1.600 Rule in 1973 and replaced it with
a "2.0" Rule. Under the 2.0 Rule, the standardized test score consideration
was dropped, and a student-athlete's eligibility was conditioned upon attaining
an overall grade point average of 2.0 or higher.
226
Although the NCAA was under attack for allowing colleges and
universities to permit athletes to allow academic life to be subordinate to
athletic success, it was only after a highly publicized lawsuit by an English
professor at the University of Georgia that the NCAA instituted eligibility
reform known as "Proposition 48" in 1986.227 Proposition 48 required that a
high school student-athlete maintain at least a "C" average, or a 2.0 grade
point average, in eleven high school core curriculum courses. 228 It also
220. 367 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
221. Id. at 910. The district court upheld the scholarship revocation because Begley did not meet
the requirements of a signed agreement stating he would "maintain ... a minimum [grade point]
average of 1.6 [and] abide by [all] rules and regulations of the NCAA". Id.
222. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating "[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws").
223. 361 F. Supp. 1220, 1226-28 (W.D. La. 1973), affd, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding
that although appellants lost the opportunity to play in NCAA-sponsored tournaments and televised
games, they had not been deprived of a "property" or "liberty" interest because of the NCAA's
enforcement of its 1.600 rule against Centenary College).
224. Id. at 1224-25 (citing San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23 (1973), which held, in an
equality of wealth challenge by a Texas school district, that education was not a fundamental right
protected by the constitution).
225. Id.
226. Denbo, supra note 90, at 156.
227. See Kemp v. Ervin, 651 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (challenging the University of
Georgia's policies for giving preferential treatment to athletes in order to maintain their eligibility).
Professor Kemp claimed she was demoted and later terminated for refusing to "coddle semi-illiterate
athletes" by raising the failing grades of athletes in her remedial English class. Id. See also
Pentimone, supra note 53, at 472 (quoting a sports writer as saying, "If you could walk and chew ice,
you were eligible to play basketball" in the pre-Proposition 48 period).
228. NCAA, 2003-04 NCAA GUIDE FOR THE COLLEGE-BOUND STUDENT ATHLETE (2003),
available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/general/cbsa/ 2 0 0 3 -04 /2 0
0 3
-04 cbsa-main.pdf. To meet the
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required that a student-athlete attain a score of 700 out of a possible 1600 on
the SAT or a comparable score on the ACT in order to attain "qualifier"
status. 229  While many educators denounced the 700 score as being
"embarrassingly low," there were still reports of athletes who managed to
attend competitive schools with low SAT scores. 230 Proposition 48 also
initiated the concept of eligibility status known as a "partial qualifier."231
Significant debate about the fairness of the Proposition 48 was an
immediate issue. Criticism came primarily in predicting discriminatory
impact on minority and low-income athletes by inclusion of standardized
testing requirements. 23 2 There was also a concern that "wealthier schools
would 'stockpile' partial qualifiers by providing full [financial] aid. ' 233
"core course" requirement: (1) The core course must be defined as a recognized academic course and
qualify for high school graduation credit in one or a combination of the following areas: English,
Mathematics (Algebra I or higher), Natural/physical science, Social science, Foreign language,
Computer science (excluding keyboarding and Word processing), or non-doctrinal
religion/philosophy, e.g. comparative religion classes; (2) The course must be considered college
preparatory by the high school. College preparatory is defined for these purposes as any course that
prepares a student academically to enter a four-year collegiate institution upon graduation from high
school; and (3) The course must be taught by a qualified instructor defined by the appropriate
academic authority, e.g., high school, school district or state agency with authority of such matters,
and at or above the high school's regular academic level, i.e. remedial, special education or
compensatory courses shall not be considered core courses. Id. at 4. See also NCAA, supra note 157,
§ 14.3.
229. Pentimone, supra note 53, at 482. If the SAT was taken after April 1, 1995, the high school
athlete had to have a score of 820 instead of 700, due to a new scoring system imposed by the
Educational Testing Service. Id.
230. Id. At Florida State University, two football players earned athletic scholarships scoring less
than 450 on the SAT when the median score for incoming freshman was 1020; at Tulane University, a
student-athlete was admitted with a SAT score of only 470 when the median score for incoming
freshman was 1121. Id.
231. Id. at 483. A "partial qualifier" is a student-athlete who has the required grade point average
but not the requisite SAT/ACT score or vice versa. Id. "Partial qualifiers" can receive an athletic
scholarship but cannot compete athletically during their freshman year. Id. The NCAA is eliminating
"partial qualifier" status in the fall of 2005. Id.; see also NCAA, supra note 157, § 14.02.9 (stating
"[t]he following Bylaw 14.02.9.2, Partial Qualifier, was deleted at the October 31, 2002, NCAA
Division I Board of Directors meeting, effective August 1, 2005).
232. Denbo, supra note 90, at 157; Shropshire, supra note 53, at 143; Rosen, supra note 53, at
198.
233. Weston, supra note 176, at 1070-71 The NCAA responded to this criticism by briefly
ratifying another eligibility modification, Proposition 42, in 1989. Id. at 1071. Proposition 42 limited
partial qualifiers to three years of competition with no athletic scholarship eligibility during their
freshman year. Id.; see also Shropshire, supra note 53, at 145. Proposition 42 was revised a year later
to allow partial qualifiers to receive non-athletic, need-based financial aid during their freshman year;
however, non-qualifiers remained ineligible for financial aid. Id.
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E. The Impact of Proposition 16 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
In 1990, the Knight Commission 234 released a report that recommended
major reforms in intercollegiate athletics; specifically cited was the
compromise of academic integrity.235 Public officials joined the attack
leading to federal legislation being enacted in 1990 requiring colleges to
disclose graduation rates for student-athletes. 236  Congressional hearings
followed in 1991 focusing on financial disclosure laws for college sports.
237
With public and government scrutiny mounting, in 1992, the NCAA voted to
increase the already controversial academic requirements for incoming
freshmen with even more stringent standards by the adoption of the equally
controversial "Proposition 16." The rule touted a commendable NCAA goal
of being driven by a desire to raise student-athlete graduation rates and close
the "gap" between African-American and white student-athlete graduation
rates; unfortunately, this current rule has not been a panacea for learning
disabled student-athletes. 238 The public relations benefit for the NCAA is that
the new rule lessened its increasingly negative image as being commercialized
and not committed to education.
Even under the stricter Proposition 16 criteria, at many schools, the
difference between the average SAT score and an athlete's SAT score exceeds
300 points.239 Under the new (and current) system, which took effect in
August 1996, the number of required core curriculum courses increased from
eleven to thirteen and added an "Initial Eligibility Index"240 - a sliding scale
234. KNIGHT FOUND. COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE
STUDENT-ATHLETE: A NEW MODEL FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (1991), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/databases/knight commission/200 1_report. The Knight Foundation
Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics was formed by the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation
in 1989 in response to more than a decade of highly visible scandals in college sports. Id. The goal of
the Commission was to recommend a reform agenda that emphasized academic values in an arena
where commercialization of college sports often overshadowed the underlying goals of higher
education. Id. The Knight Commission has played an influential role in building momentum and
mapping out a path to college sports reform.
235. Davis, supra note 190, at 57.
236. Id.; see also Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act, Pub. L. No. 101-542, 104
Stat. 2381 (1990).
237. Id.
238. Denbo, supra note 90, at 158.
239. Rosen, supra note 53, at 210.
240. Weston, supra note 233, at 1072. "The Index correlates minimum acceptable core GPAs and
standardized test scores, such that higher grades can offset lower standardized test scores." Id. Under
the 2003-2004 guidelines, a student with a 2.5 GPA or higher requires a SAT score of 820 for
eligibility whereas a student with a 2.0 GPA requires a SAT score of 1010. NCAA, supra note 228, at
2.
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system designed to decrease the impact of standardized test scores. In order to
obtain certification to participate in sports at the Division I and Division II
level, prospective student-athletes must first submit an application and sign a
release form with the NCAA Initial-Eligibility Clearinghouse
(Clearinghouse). 24 1 The Clearinghouse applies the NCAA's initial eligibility
requirements and certifies the status of a prospective student-athlete as either a
"qualifier,"242 "partial qualifier," (through July 2005)243 or "nonqualifier. ''244
Disputes between curriculum interpretation by local school districts and the
Clearinghouse also have been the source of lawsuits.245
Despite efforts by the NCAA to legitimize the eligibility process, the
rhetorical question critics of the collegiate athletics admissions process
continue to raise is "Why should a student who meets minimum Proposition
16 criteria be admitted over a student with a 1400 SAT score and 3.75 GPA?"
The answer, in this context, is not the compelling state interest in diversity
used to justify affirmative action programs,246  but that university
administrators argue that successful big-time athletic programs, "1) attract
attention to a school; 2) increase academic prestige; 3) boost student
241. NCAA, supra note 157, § 14.3.1; see also Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 461. ("The
Clearinghouse is a division of the American College Testing Service (ACT) which operates under a
contract between the ACT and the NCAA to determine the eligibility of prospective athletes. The
NCAA has delegated to the Clearinghouse the authority to determine the eligibility of students to
participate in athletics at, and to receive athletic scholarships to member institutions during their
freshman year." Id. at 461 n.2.
242. NCAA, supra note 157, § 14.02.9.1. To obtain qualifier status, a student must graduate from
high school, meet core curriculum requirements, and meet minimum GPA and SAT or ACT score
requirements. Id.
243. Id. § 14.02.9.2 (describing a high school graduate who failed to meet both the minimum
core requirements GPA and SAT/ACT score requirements).
244. Id. A nonqualifier is a student who has not graduated from high school or who, at the time
specified by the regulation, presented neither the core curriculum GPA nor the SAT/ACT score
required for a qualifier. Id.
245. See, e.g., Van Troba v. Mont. State Univ., 970 P.2d 1029 (Mont. 1998) (examining the case
of a high school student who was advised that Journalism I was an acceptable core course; the NCAA
rejected the course, causing the student to fall short of the thirteen course requirement by one-half
core credit); Hall, 985 F. Supp. at 795 (examining the NCAA's decision to exclude the courses of
Microsoft Office, Microsoft Works, Scripture, and Ethics/Morality; high school advised student
computer classes would meet core requirements but conceded they had doubts as to whether religion
courses "would get through or not"); Phillip v. NCAA, 960 F. Supp. 552 (D. Conn. 1997) (examining
the case of a high school who was awarded 0.5 core credits for Sequential Math I course; The
Clearinghouse valued the course at 0.33 core credits leading to the student's failure to qualify);
Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *3 (examining Michigan State University's argument on behalf of the
plaintiff that he had failed to take the requisite "core courses" in part because he had relied on his high
school's belief that the remedial courses he was taking qualified as core courses).
246. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
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enrollment; and 4) build school spirit."24 7 A recent NCAA study, however,
disputes this widely accepted belief.248
F. The Impact of the ADA: The NCAA and Reasonable Accommodations for
Student-athletes with Learning Disabilities
Lawsuits involving learning disability claims filed by student-athletes
seemed to flourish following the passage of the ADA. It is unfortunate that
the ADA has at times been a convenient forum for some student-athletes with
and without specific learning disabilities to try to circumvent the stricter
NCAA eligibility standards that were being instituted. The discrimination
claims generally sought to have the NCAA modify, alter, or waive its
eligibility requirements in accordance with ADA mandates for individuals
with learning disabilities. 249  The NCAA standards setting minimum
standardized test scores and core course requirements were challenged as
having a discriminatory impact on minorities and individuals with learning
disabilities.250
The increasing number of complaints and lawsuits against the NCAA251
led to the May 1998 filing of a civil action by the Civil Rights Division of the
DOJ alleging violations under Title III of the ADA. 252 The complaint
followed a two-year investigation of NCAA allegations beginning in 1995 and
found that several of the NCAA's policies, practices, and procedures related to
determining initial eligibility discriminated against student-athletes with
learning disabilities. 253 The complaint cited as evidence the NCAA's refusal
247. Pentimore, supra note 53, at 476. See also id. at 500 (quoting Marianne Jennings, former
associate dean of business at Arizona State University, as having said, "There are certain truths in life.
You don't spit in the wind, you don't tug on Superman's cape, and you don't mess around with star
football players"). See also KNIGHT FouND. COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note
169.
248. Robert H. Frank, Challenging the Myth; A Review of the Links Among College Athletic
Success, Student Quality, and Donations, at http://www.knightfdn.org/
efault.asp?story-=athletics/reports/2004%5Ffrankreport/index.html (May 2004) (reviewing numerous
empirical studies and finding that if success in athletics does generate indirect benefits such as greater
contributions by donors and stimulate additional applications from prospective students, the effects
are very small).
249. Weston, supra note 176, at 1059.
250. Rothstein, supra note 6, at 407.
251. Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 459; Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *1; Butler, 1996 WL 1058233,
at * 1. See also Adam Milani, Can I Play?: The Dilemma of the Disabled Athlete in Interscholastic
Sports, 49 ALA. L. REv. 817, 875 (1998). In the 1996-1997 academic year, the NCAA rejected nearly
every waiver request by learning disabled student-athletes who did not meet the standardized test
score requirement. Id. at 879.
252. See Compl., supra note 2.
253. Id.; see also Press Release, FairTest, Justice Department Finds NCAA in Violation of ADA;
[Vol. 15:2
PLA YING THE GAME OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY
to certify as meeting the core curriculum requirement classes that were
designed to accommodate students with learning disabilities as part of a
school's special education curriculum or courses the NCAA considered
"remedial." 2 54 The complaint also charged that the NCAA policies adversely
affected student-athletes with learning disabilities by denying them the
opportunity to participate in collegiate athletic programs and noted such a
forum often provided motivation for academic success.
25 5
In a concurrent filing with the civil complaint, the DOJ acknowledged that
the NCAA had engaged in "good faith" negotiations to resolve the matter after
being notified of preliminary findings in October 1997 and entered into a
Consent Decree. 25 6  Under the agreement, the NCAA agreed to make
modifications to its process for determining initial and continued eligibility,
include experts in learning disabilities when reviewing applications for
determination of granting a waiver, establish an "ADA Compliance
Coordinator" position to serve as a liaison between NCAA staff and students,
and pay a total of $35,000 in damages to four student-athletes. 257 The formal
oversight by the DOJ ended on May 1, 2003.258
Since formally recognizing that learning-disabled students may have
difficulty complying with initial eligibility requirements, the NCAA has
instituted several changes specifically directed toward enabling these students
to attain "qualifier" status. The twelve-hour requirement for full-time student
status, as well as the progress toward college degree requirement, can now be
waived if objective evidence demonstrates that less than twelve hours is
needed to accommodate the student's learning disability. 259 With reference to
the core curriculum, the presence of a high school course title that includes
designations such as "remedial," "special education," "special needs," or other
Criticizes Use of Standardized Test Scores (Oct. 30, 1997), available at
http://www.fairtest.org/pr/ncaajust.htm (citing the Justice Department's October 17, 1997 letter to the
NCAA as saying, "[t]here is a consensus that using a standardized test score as the sole criterion for
determining the ability of students with learning disabilities succeed academically in college tends to
screen out such students because of their disabilities").
254. See Compl., supra note 2.
255. Id.; see Banishing the Stereotype of the "Dumb Black Jock," J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC.,
Nov. 25, 2004 (on file with author) (citing NCAA data that only 34 percent of black males graduate
from college within 6 years, but that 39 percent of black male scholarship athletes graduate from
college within that same timeframe. For black female college students, the rates are 45 percent and
60 percent, respectively).
256. United States Department of Justice, NCAA Settlement with the Justice Department - Fact
Sheet, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/ncaafact.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
257. Id
258. Id.
259. NCAA, supra note 157, § 14.1.8.2.2.1.3; see also id. § 14.4.3.8.
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similar titles no longer automatically disqualifies a course from satisfying the
requirements. 260 Students with disabilities may also use scores achieved
during a nonstandard administration of the SAT or ACT, and the testing
agencies no longer identify students who have been granted testing
accommodation due to a documented disability. 261 In addition, students are
now allowed a fourth season of eligibility for intercollegiate competition if
they have completed at least 80 percent of the requirements for their degree
program by the beginning of the fifth academic year.262
At the same time the NCAA seems to be going out of its way to "level the
playing field" for students with learning disabilities, it is continuing to "raise
the bar" to gradually make the general initial eligibility requirements more
stringent through the 2008 academic year. Beginning with the fall 2003
academic year, the number of core curriculum courses required increased from
thirteen to fourteen academic courses. 263 In the fall of 2005, students will be
required to have one year of additional academic coursework.2 64 In an
apparent effort to place greater emphasis on performance in the classroom and
deemphasize performance on standardized tests, under the 2005 guidelines, the
inverse relationship on the sliding scale grade point average to SAT test score
requirement will be expanded. 265
Beginning in the fall 2008 academic year, incoming students will be
required to have had three years (instead of the current two years) of
mathematics (at the Algebra I level or above), and the number of core
curriculum courses will increase from fourteen to sixteen academic courses. 266
260. Id. § 14.3.1.2.5. For special education courses, the high school principal must submit a
written statement to the NCAA indicating that the courses are substantially comparable, quantitatively
and qualitatively, to similar core course offerings in that academic discipline and the courses appear
on the high school's list of approved core courses. Id.
261. Id. § 14.3.1.3.3. The student must still achieve the minimum required test score; however,
the test does not have to be administered on a national testing date. Id.
262. Id. § 14.3.3.2.
263. NCAA, supra note 228, at 3. For a two-year period that will end beginning with the fall
2005 academic year, students have the option of being evaluated under the thirteen or fourteen core
course standards. 1d.
264. Id. See also NCAA, supra note 157, § 14.3.1.1. The qualifier applies to student-athletes
first entering a collegiate institution on or after August 1, 2005. Id. With an increased focus on basic
skills, computer science courses, unless they contain significant programming elements and meet
graduation requirements under mathematics or natural/physical science, will no longer be accepted.
Id.
265. Id. Under the current guidelines, students with a GPA of 2.500 and above are required to
have a SAT score of 820; each ten point decrease in a student's SAT score or one point decrease on
the ACT requires a corresponding increase of 0.025 in the student's GPA, e.g., a student with a GPA
of 3.500 and above only has to attain a SAT score of 400 for academic eligibility. Id.
266. Id. This requirement applies to student-athletes first entering a collegiate institution on or
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These requirements are to be applauded if they have the intended effect of
enhancing the academic preparation of student-athletes generally. However, it
is an open question as to whether the modifications, specifically those related
to a sliding scale for standardized test score requirements, 267 will have the
anticipated positive impact on increasing education and athletic opportunities
for low-income minorities and students with specific learning disabilities.
Realistically, it will probably be the infrequent case that a strong student (e.g.,
GPA 3.00 to 3.55) will be in the position to benefit from the lowered
requirement of only requiring a SAT score of 620 decreasing to 400 to meet
eligibility standards as opposed to the more likely scenario of the student with
a GPA decreasing from the 2.30 to 2.00 range being in the untenable situation
of needing a SAT score of 900 increasing to 1010 to qualify.
268
Compliance with eligibility rules is complicated by the reality that
successful collegiate athletic programs, directly and indirectly, generate
significant revenue for the NCAA, colleges, and universities. 269 NCAA
President, Myles Brand, was recently quoted in a speech lamenting that the
vast money at stake in college athletics is "distorting the mission of higher
education." 270  As previously noted, given the potential for significant
financial gain, alumni support, and job security when their sports teams win
championships, there is an enormous temptation to make ethical compromises
such as admitting athletically gifted athletes who do not meet academic
standards or accommodating a non-existent learning disability.271 College
coaches and advisors also have the ethical challenge of assembling a
reasonably attainable course load and not tampering with academic
after August 1, 2008. Id.
267. Note, The Racial Scoring Gap on the SAT May Be Wider Than the Official Statistics Show,
44 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 42 (2004) (stating that in 2003, the College Board reported that the
mean combined SAT score for black students was 857, which was 206 points below the mean score
for white students; the data was based on 1,050, 977 test takers who identified their race or ethnic
background).
268. The example is based on NCAA Initial-eligibility index effective August 1, 2008.
269. See, e.g., Nygren, supra note 9, at 360-61 (stating "Division I football and basketball players
generate approximately $3.5 billion per year for the NCAA and its member institutions"; also
estimating that "a top men's basketball player was estimated to generate more than $1 million of
revenue for his university"). Nygren also cited specific examples of revenue generation at Stanford
University where the men's basketball program generated $4.6 million against $2.2 million in
expenditures during the 1999-2000 season, and the University of Minnesota, where men's basketball
netted $6.3 million and men's hockey returned a profit of more than $4 million. Id. at 360.
270. Gregorian, supra note 56, at Ft. President Brand added that "[t]his escalation of success
demanding even more success has good people with noble intentions chasing both the carrot and their
tails." Id.
271. See supra notes 166-70.
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requirements while ensuring continued eligibility for the student-athlete. 272
The NCAA tracks the academic success of student-athletes, as evidenced
by graduation rates, division, race, gender, and sport. There is not a separate
tracking of the progress of students who are being accommodated for learning
disabilities. However, although national graduation rates of student-athletes
are slightly higher than the general student body under Proposition 16, black
males in the big-time, revenue-producing sports continue to graduate at a low
rate.273 It is possible that the demands of being a successful athlete contribute
to diminished academic success for a greater percentage of this population or
it may be an extension of the greater prevalence of learning disability
diagnoses among black males in school age populations. 274
V. JUDICIAL VIEWS ON ACCOMMODATING THE LEARNING DISABLED
STUDENT-ATHLETE; MENTALLY VS. PHYSICALLY DISABLED ATHLETE
COMPARISONS
A. The Impact of Sutton and the Justice Department Consent Decree on
Learning Disabled Student-Athletes
As previously noted, since the first lawsuits were filed and in the wake of
the Consent Decree, the NCAA has significantly changed its eligibility
standards. The NCAA now allows for a more individualized assessment of
prospective athletes, but the permissibility of these standards under disability
discrimination law has not been fully addressed in the courts.275 In order for a
student-athlete with a learning disability to prevail in a discrimination claim,
the student-athlete must establish all of the requisite elements described earlier
for an ADA claim. There have been several cases on this issue, and as the
discussion below will demonstrate, the court findings generally have been
unfavorable to the student-athletes.
272. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 53, at 194 (stating that schools that exploit student athletes are
more inclined to overlook a student's 700 SAT score or 2.0 GPA and focus on his 28 point basketball
game averages or 350 passing yards per football game because there is so much on the line).
273. NCAA, NCAA Division I Graduation Rates Continue to Exceed Student Body, at
http://www2.ncaa.org/pageprinter (Oct. 25, 2004). Division I football student-athletes entering
institutions in 1997 completed the six-year cycle with a graduation rate as follows: white football
players graduated at 65 percent, versus 60 percent for all white male students; black football players
graduated at 48 percent, versus 36 percent for all Black male students. Id. The graduation rate for
Division I basketball players was 48 percent for white males and 42 percent for black males. Id.
274. Refer to discussion, supra notes 49-51.
275. Laura F. Rothstein, Don't Roll in my Parade: The Impact of Sports and Entertainment Cases
on Public Awareness and Understanding of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 REV. LITIG. 399,
407 (2000).
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In Ganden v. NCAA, 276 a pre-Sutton and pre-consent decree case, a
nationally ranked swimmer with a learning disability (a decoding disability
that primarily affected his reading and writing skills) sued the NCAA when he
was only granted "partial qualifier" status. 277 He charged the NCAA's screen
out procedures denied him the privilege to participate in swimming
competitions for failing to meet the minimum GPA and core course
requirements due to his disability. 27 8 Due to his learning disability, Ganden's
application was automatically forwarded to the NCAA Subcommittee on
Initial-Eligibility Waiver (hereinafter "Subcommittee") for review. 279
Although the NCAA was specifically asked by the DOJ to grant Ganden's
waiver application, 280 the Subcommittee only provided Ganden with "partial
qualifier" status.28
1
In its defense to Ganden's claim, the NCAA did not raise the issue of
mitigating factors to challenge his disabled status even though he had achieved
a 3.0 GPA during his senior year, in part due to the interventions of a team of
school counselors who designed a curriculum to address his specific disability
and academic weaknesses. 282 If a plaintiff similar to Ganden would present
today, a Sutton analysis would consider the mitigating impact of the school's
interventions and conceivably determine that the individual was not disabled
because he was not "substantially limited" in a "major life activity" when the
mitigating factors are considered. In ruling against Ganden, the court held he
could not defeat the NCAA's contention that lowering the minimum GPA
276. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *1.
277. Id at *5. Ganden argued in order to qualify for an elite national swim team, he needed "to
have as much elite competition and sanctioned swim times as possible." Id. He also noted that "[a]t
the elite level, the average competitive life of a swimmer is only three to four years, with the peak
years occurring between ages nineteen and twenty one." Id.
278. Id. at *4-*5. The NCAA Subcommittee refused to consider a LRC Typing and LRC
Computers class as "core" course; also, based on Ganden's compiled ACT scores after taking the test
three times under a nonstandardized testing condition, his GPA of 2.136 did not meet the minimum
2.275 requirement for "qualifier" status. Id. at *4.
279. Id. In reviewing the application, the Subcommittee looked at courses taken, the
Individualized Education Plan (IEP), progression of grades and test scores, and other actions taken to
compensate for a disability. Id.
280. Id. at *4. "During this time, the Department of Justice had been involved in an ongoing
dialogue with the NCAA over its eligibility requirements and their impact on learning disabled
students." Id.
281. Id. at *5. Ganden did not meet the minimum GPA for even "partial qualifier" status, but the
Subcommittee considered his learning disabled status and record indicating academic improvement.
Id.
282. Id. The school district developed an IEP which allowed a resource study hall each day,
alternative test-taking procedures, and books on tape and enrolled him in five classes intended to
address his weaknesses. Id. at * 1.
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requirement and acceptance of non-substantive courses as "core" would
"fundamentally alter" the privilege of participation in intercollegiate
swimming. 283 The court further held that the NCAA had met its requirement
to provide an individual assessment to requests for modifications through its
waiver provisions.284
In the case of Hall v. NCAA, 285 a non-disabled basketball player with
aspirations to play professionally but who had an academic profile similar to
Ganden unsuccessfully sued the NCAA when he was determined to be a
"nonqualifier."286 After taking the ACT four times, Hall had a sum score of
70 and a 2.346 GPA; the corresponding minimum GPA for "qualifier" status
was 2.425. Hall's request for a waiver consideration was denied by the
NCAA. 287 Demonstrating the limited situations in which using the waiver
process is considered appropriate, the NCAA unapologetically countered that
GPA deficit waivers where there are no extenuating circumstances related to
the athlete's failure to meet the GPA requirement were granted zero percent of
the time. 288 It is critical that the NCAA consistently take a somewhat rigid
approach in situations such as these so that the legitimacy of the waiver
process is not compromised.
In another pre-Sutton and pre-Consent Degree case, Tatum v. NCAA, 289
the question of how wide the reach of the learning disorders "net" should be
cast was addressed. In Tatum, a basketball player with a history of marginal
academic performance filed suit against the NCAA upon being notified that he
would not be certified as "qualified" because he had failed to achieve an
adequate standardized test score.290 Tatum had been approved to take the
ACT under nonstandard conditions (untimed tests were administered in May,
August, and October 1997),291 achieving a qualifying score of seventy-nine
283. Id. at'16-*17.
284. Id. at "16.
285. 985 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
286. Id. at 791.
287. Id.
288. Id. The NCAA testified that even when there were extenuating circumstances, e.g., death of
a family member, causing grades to drop significantly, waivers were only granted 10 percent of the
time. Id.
289. 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998). Plaintiff included SLU as a defendant in the action to
allow him to seek an order requiring the university to honor its commitment to provide him a full
athletic scholarship once he was determined to be a qualifier. Id. at 1117. Plaintiff did not bring a
separate cause of action against SLU.
290. Id. at 1119. Based on his GPA of 2.269, plaintiff needed an ACT score of 77 or higher for
Division I intercollegiate eligibility. Id. at 1117.
291. Tatum had also taken the ACT under standard conditions during his junior year of high
school. Id.
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after being diagnosed as suffering from a "generalized anxiety disorder and a
specific phobia related to test taking." 292
When Tatum's scores were submitted to the NCAA, the NCAA's learning
disability consultant concluded that he did not have a learning disability or
physical disability as defined by the NCAA Bylaws, and the scores from the
non-standard ACT administrations were not accepted.293 The NCAA reported
that it recognized and allowed accommodations for attention deficit disorder
(ADD), but had never accepted nonstandard scores for a psychological
disorder such as this. 294 The questionable circumstances surrounding Tatum's
diagnosis appropriately led the NCAA to suspect its legitimacy.
Although Tatum had a lifelong history of performing better on daily
assignments than major examinations and standardized tests, it was not until
the middle of his junior year that he told a guidance counselor that he felt
"distracted and nervous" when testing. 295 By the fall of his senior year, the
counselor suggested Tatum be evaluated for potential disabilities when it
became apparent that his athletic scholarship offer to Saint Louis University
(SLU) might be in jeopardy.296 A doctoral student, under the supervision of a
licensed psychologist, at the SLU Psychological Services Center evaluated
Tatum, and both concluded he did not have a learning disability and just
needed to spend more time on his studies.297 A month later, tests conducted
by a different licensed psychologist identified the psychological disorder
discussed above.298  This case is a classic example of the professional
inconsistencies in the mental health community discussed in section I that
cause the legitimacy of diagnoses to become suspect.
The court was suspicious of the timing of Tatum's diagnosis and refused to
grant him a preliminary injunction reasoning that he had not "demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of establishing that he had a disability. ' 299 Even more
indicting than the fact that the conflicting diagnoses were made within a very
292. Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1118. The plaintiffs diagnosis is recognized in the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. See AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 24, at 50.
293. Id.; see NCAA, supra note 157, § 14.3.1.4.3.
294. Tatum, 992 F. Supp. at 1122. In 1996, the NCAA only rejected 5 of the 1498 requests for
approval of nonstandard test scores. Id.
295. Id. at 1117. The guidance counselor subsequently got plaintiffs math, history, and Spanish
teachers to allow him extra time to complete tests. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. At plaintiffs mother's request, three additional psychological tests were conducted which
concluded that plaintiff did not suffer from a learning disability or test anxiety. Id.
298. Id. at ll18.
299. Id. at 1123.
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close time frame was that on cross-examination, the psychologist who
diagnosed the learning disability conceded that Tatum's "poor performance on
standardized tests could possibly be related to a lack of motivation or
preparation." 300 It is critical to the spirit of the Consent Decree that cases such
as this be given close scrutiny so that appropriate accommodation
determinations are made. In terms of how this situation would fare under a
Sutton analysis, if one accepts the diagnostic findings of the second
psychologist as valid, it is conceivable that a plaintiff similarly situated to
Tatum would meet "substantial limitation" criteria since attempts at self-
mitigation were unsuccessful.
The court in another pre-Sutton but post-Consent Decree student-athlete
case, Bowers v. NCAA (Bowers JI),30 1 held that a learning disabled football
player who had been in special education classes in elementary and secondary
school might be able to establish a disability claim under the ADA.302 The
NCAA and defendant college moved to dismiss (and moved for summary
judgment as an alternative) by countering that the student was not disabled
under the ADA.30 3 In support of their position, they argued that he had
successfully completed a significant amount of high school mathematics
courses in a relatively short timeframe and was doing well in his classes at
Temple University (where he ultimately enrolled). 304 Applying a pre-Sutton
interpretation, the court held that the plaintiffs learning disability should be
considered without regard to mitigating measures and that under that analysis,
he met the criteria for being substantially limited in the major life activity of
learning. 305
On subsequent appeal, the post-Sutton court in Bowers v. NCAA (Bowers
JJ1),306 responding to allegations that the NCAA eligibility criteria "tend to
screen out" disabled individuals, refused to grant summary judgment to the
NCAA because of its failure to demonstrate that its treatment of special
300. Id.
301. 9 F. Supp. 2d. 460 (D.N.J. 1998). The plaintiff filed a first amended complaint to an earlier
case, Bowers, 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997), in which a preliminary injunction against the NCAA
was denied. Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 460. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff added as
defendants, the ACT Program, Temple University, the University of Iowa, and American
International College. Id.
302. Bowers, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 466. Bowers alleged that he had been denied a football scholarship
to Temple University, the University of Iowa, and American International College because the NCAA
had classified him as a "nonqualifier" based on his academic record in high school. Id. at 469-70.
303. Id. at 474-75.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. 118 F. Supp. 2d 494 (D.N.J. 2000).
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education courses under the core course requirement was essential or
necessary to its mission of ensuring that student-athletes will succeed
academically in their freshman year.30 7
The NCAA went on to successfully defend against Bowers's reasonable
accommodation allegations by pointing out he was afforded a waiver
procedure consistent with the terms of the Consent Decree and that it had
performed a substantive analysis of each of Bowers's special education
courses. 30 8  The NCAA concluded that Bowers had indeed received a
reasonable accommodation under the waiver procedure, but that the waiver
procedure found him unqualified. 309 Bowers offered several reasons why the
waiver procedure was not a reasonable accommodation; 310 however, the court
was not persuaded by his arguments except for finding that the NCAA did not
complete the waiver in a timeframe that would have allowed Bowers an
opportunity to compete for a scholarship for his freshman year.311  The
Bowers case continues to work its way through the appeals process, but it is
evident that the consent decree has not lived up to the NCAA's prediction that
it "[r]emoves any dispute as to the [NCAA's] compliance with federal law in
this matter." 312 Although there were no Sutton issues addressed in the appeal,
this holding suggests the courts will be generally deferential to the NCAA if it
is following the consent decree modifications, even if the system is still far
from perfect.
Another post-Sutton and post-consent decree case further demonstrated
NCAA deference by the court related to continued eligibility for enrolled
collegiate athletes. In Matthews v. NCAA, 313 a learning-disabled Washington
State University sophomore was denied a third NCAA waiver for the 1999
307. Id. at 518.
308. Id. at 520.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 521-22. Bowers argued the waiver procedure did not provide reasonable
accommodation because
(1) the process occur[red] too late in the recruitment timetable to allow learning disabled students
a meaningful opportunity for recruitment if a waiver is granted; (2) ... the members of the
subcommittee that evaluate[d] the waiver applications [were] unqualified; (3)... the NCAA
[did] not publicize the availability of the waiver application; (4) ... Bowers had no actual or
constructive knowledge of the availability of the waiver process during his senior year of high
school; (5) ... the subcommittee did not have a complete record before it [when his waiver
application was] considered; (6) ... Bower's waiver process came too late in the recruitment
process; and (7) ... the subcommittee improperly treated Bower's application.
Id.
311. Id. at 525.
312. Denbo, supra note 90, at 199.
313. 79 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
2005]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
football season 314 for failing to make satisfactory progress toward his degree
under the "75/25 Rule." 315 In defending its position, the NCAA did not raise
any Sutton issues or dispute the existence of the plaintiffs learning disability
that significantly impaired his ability to read and write, thereby interfering
with his academic achievement. 316 In denying a preliminary injunction and
vacating a temporary restraining order against the NCAA, the court held that
the NCAA had made reasonable accommodations for Matthews.317 Pointing
out that one of the NCAA's "primary purposes [was] to ensure that student-
athletes succeed in the 'student' as well as the 'athlete' portion of their college
experience," the court held that requiring any further accommodation would
require the NCAA to dispense with essential eligibility criteria beyond what is
required by the ADA.
318
The negative impact of NCAA eligibility on minority athletes was
specifically raised in a post-Sutton and post-Consent Decree case, Pryor v.
NCAA, 319 filed by a learning disabled African-American female athlete with
an athletic scholarship to San Jose State University. 320 Although the NCAA
granted her petition for partial qualifier status based on her learning disability,
Pryor brought disability discrimination claims under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act. 321 An African-American male classmate joined her as a
co-defendant 322 in a second claim of race discrimination related to athletic
eligibility under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.323 Pryor alleged that
the NCAA's Proposition 16 eligibility criteria caused increased numbers of
314. Id. at 1202. "The NCAA [had] granted Plaintiff waivers from various academic
requirements for both the 1997 and 1998 season. In October 1997, Plaintiff received a waiver that
permitted him to take nine credit hours per semester instead of the required twelve credits. In August
1998, Plaintiff received a waiver of the 75/25 Rule." Id.
315. Id. (citing NCAA Bylaw § 14.4.3.1.3 which provides: "A student-athlete shall earn at least
75 percent of the minimum number of semester.., hours required for satisfactory progress during the
academic year. The student-athlete shall earn no more than 25 percent of the minimum number of
semester hours required for satisfactory progress during the summer").
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1208.
318. Id. at 1206.
319. 288 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002).
320. Id. at 554.
321. Id. at 555.
322. Id. The co-defendant, Warren Spivey, was a student-athlete who was unable to meet
Proposition 16 eligibility requirements to play football at the University of Connecticut (UConn). Id.
UConn petitioned for a NCAA waiver on Spivey's behalf; the university argued "that [his academic]
record showed that he was prepared for the academic requirements of college." Id. The NCAA
denied the petition preventing Spivey from receiving athletically related financial aid or participating
in varsity athletics during his freshman year. Id.
323. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
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black student-athletes to lose athletic scholarship eligibility, as well as
eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics during their freshman year,
if only meeting "partial qualifier" status.32 4
The district and appellate court rulings on Pryor dismissed the ADA claim
as inappropriate at the time of filing as a result of its failure to satisfy the
Constitution's Article III "case or controversy" requirements due to "lack of
ripeness" and "lack of redress. ' 325 The claim failed for ripeness because
NCAA Bylaws allow learning-disabled athletes to "earn back" a fourth year of
eligibility by completing seventy-five percent of their degree requirements by
the end of their fourth year.326 The "earn back" availability triggered the
failure under lack of redress. 327 Pryor had not entered her fourth year of
potential eligibility at the time the case was filed, and if she met the NCAA
eligibility requirements at that time, her lost year of freshman eligibility would
be restored, rendering her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for injunctive
relief moot.328 In ruling on the race discrimination claims, the court dismissed
the disparate impact claim citing a Supreme Court holding that unintentional
discrimination charges were not allowed by private individuals under Title
VI.329 However, the court remanded the discrimination claim filed under §
1981 back to the district court because the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged
purposeful discrimination. 330
There is no consensus resolution on the legal validity of the NCAA
standards. 331 The courts have definitively acknowledged, however, that it is
legitimate for both collegiate institutions and the NCAA to establish rules that
do not fundamentally alter their programs or substantially modify academic
324. Pryor, 288 F.3d at 552.
325. Id. Constitutional standing requires pleadings that show (1) a legally recognized injury; (2)
caused by the named defendant or at least "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant";
and (3) that a favorable decision by the court would likely redress. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
167 (1997); U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
326. Pryor, 288 F.3d at 557. See NCAA, supra note 157, § 14.3.3.2.
327. Id. at 561. Redress will "deprive a court of jurisdiction over cases in which the likelihood
that the requested relief would remedy the plaintiffs injury is 'only speculative."' In re Thornburgh,
869 F.2d 1503, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 554. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) (holding "Title VI directly
reach[es] only instances of intentional discrimination").
330. Anneliese Munczinski, Interception! The Courts Get Another Pass at the NCAA and the
Intentional Discrimination of Proposition 16 in Pryor v. NCAA, 10 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 389,
411-12 (2003) (describing three-prong analysis for § 1981 case as: (1) Plaintiff must "show that
he[/]she is a member of a racial minority[; (2)] [T]he defendants intended to discriminate on the basis
of race[; and (3)] [T]he discrimination concerned one of the activities covered in § 1981"). "In this
case, the activity was the right to contract." Id. at 412.
331. Rothstein, supra note 275, at 407.
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requirements in order to allow students, -including student-athletes attending
on college scholarships, to meet the rigorous demands of college-level
academic work.332 In fact, at least one court has emphatically stated that while
the ADA requires "evenhanded treatment" of individuals with disabilities, it
does not require "affirmative action."
333
B. Contrasting Judicial Views Involving Physically Disabled Student-Athletes
While colleges and universities have been generally receptive to
accommodating students with physical disabilities in the wake of the ADA,
334
student-athletes with physical disabilities have not been met with the same
reception. Two disabled athlete cases, Knapp v. Northwestern University
335
and Pahula v. University of Kansas,336 have illustrated that the courts will not
require schools to accommodate student-athletes with physical disabilities
even if the student is willing to accept the risk and/or release and indemnify
the university from liability. In the Knapp case, the court sustained the
university's decision to refuse to allow a student with an internal heart
defibrillator to play basketball at the recommendation of the team physician
and other consultants. 337 In a good faith gesture, the university did not rescind
a previously awarded basketball scholarship, thus allowing him access to all
the academic and non-academic services available to Northwestern
students. 338 In its ruling, the court expressly stated that "[p]laying or enjoying
intercollegiate sports cannot be held out as a necessary part of learning for all
students." 339
332. See, e.g., Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999); Cureton v.
NCAA, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999); Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass.
1998); Philip, 960 F. Supp. at 552; McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1131 (1994); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791 (1st
Cir. 1992); Parish, 506 F.2d at 1028.
333. Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1031 (6th Cir. 1995).
334. See, e.g., Donald Stone, The Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Legal
Education and Academic Modifications for Disabled Law Students: An Empirical Study, 44 U. KAN.
L. REv. 567, 580 (1996) (describing the variety of academic accommodations being provided to law
students to include access to parking, extension of time for degree completion, priority in course
registration, authorization to tape record classes, readers and Braille teaching material for blind
students, sign language interpreters for deaf students, and access to modified classroom equipment).
335. Knapp, 101 F. 3dat473.
336. 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995).
337. Knapp, 101 F.3d at 476-77. The university relied inter alia on published findings in 24 J.
AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 845, 894 (1994) stating "[flor athletes with implantable defibrillators ... all
moderate and high intensity sports are contraindicated." Id. at 477.
338. Id. at481.
339. Id. at 480 (emphasis in original).
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In the Pahula case, a student was not allowed to participate in
intercollegiate football at the University of Kansas (KU) following a hit to the
head that resulted in transient quadriplegia during a football scrimmage. 340
Citing "common sense" and the ADA, the university argued that playing
intercollegiate football was not a major life activity. 341 As in the Knapp case,
the plaintiffs athletic scholarship was continued, and KU was able to
successfully argue that its actions did not substantially limit his opportunity to
learn. 342 The Supreme Court has recently held in the employment context that
it is not a violation of the ADA under Title I to refuse to allow an employee to
be a "threat to self."343 It seems only logical that this case will more than
likely be cited as applicable to Title III cases involving similarly situated
student-athletes in the future. Colleges will need to continue to insure,
however, that qualified physically disabled student-athletes are given fair
consideration in the eligibility process as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
Students with learning disabilities, athletes and non-athletes, are
continuing to be present at colleges and universities in increasing numbers.
There is no evidence to suggest that the numbers will decline in the future.
Although there are a multitude of definitions in the mental health community
as to what constitutes the various types of learning disabilities, there is general
agreement that students who present a valid diagnosis and seek
accommodation cannot be dismissed as the result of low intelligence, lack of
motivation, or a substandard educational system.
The ADA is appropriately within the statutory reach of learning disabled
student-athletes. Although colleges have not routinely argued this point,
attempts by the NCAA to defend that its activities did not come within the
reach of the ADA have not been accepted by the lower courts or the DOJ.
However, the recent Supreme Court rulings in the Sutton trilogy have provided
another potential defense for colleges and the NCAA under a "substantial
limitations" litmus test. To date, this defense has been successfully used in
cases involving graduate professional programs seeking accommodation for
standardized tests, but it has not been advanced in litigation involving
undergraduate students and athletes. The NCAA has not used a Sutton
340. Pahula, 897 F. Supp. at 1388.
341. Id. at 1390.
342. Id. at 1393.
343. Chevron USA v. Echarzabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (reversing a Ninth Circuit holding that
defendant could not refuse to hire a Hepatitis C positive plaintiff on the ground that employment
would pose a direct threat to the plaintiffs health and safety).
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argument as a defense against a student-athlete seeking a waiver of initial or
continued eligibility requirements.
The NCAA has made many changes to student-athlete eligibility rules
over the last fifty years. The rule changes, including the current policy,
generally have been controversial and considered suspect with reference to
whether the intent was to have true "student-athletes" or just address image
problems associated with academic scandals and diminished credibility as a
commercial endeavor. The DOJ provided an additional challenge to the
NCAA by insisting that athletic programs also comply with the ADA as part
of the 1998 Consent Decree. The NCAA and collegiate institutions have a
legal and moral obligation to ensure that the spirit of commitment toward
student-athletes with learning disabilities expressed in the ADA and the
Consent Decree are implemented ethically and in "good faith." While the
NCAA's waiver review program will provide a default defense to most
charges of disability discrimination, the NCAA must conscientiously exercise
the discretion it provides and not use it as a way to "screen out" students with
a realistic chance of collegiate success.
The courts should not penalize students, parents, elementary, and
secondary school staff who work together to identify and develop
individualized education plans that subsequently assist the student in
developing cognitive coping mechanisms to mitigate his or her disability.
Launching a "mitigating measures" defense to defeat discrimination claims
would provide a disincentive for teachers and counselors to develop
customized approaches with learning disabled but athletically gifted students.
School districts need to evaluate their "special" education programs to insure
that course content is of sufficient academic quality and complexity to meet
NCAA core course requirements while not setting unrealistic achievement
expectations for the student.
Although standardized criteria such as GPA and SAT and ACT scores
have been, and will continue to be criticized for disparate impact against
students and student-athletes who are poor, minority, reside in inner cities (or
some rural areas), and/or learning disabled; the reality is that there is nothing
on the immediate educational horizon that meets the scientific and objective
criteria necessary to replace it.344 In other words, the NCAA has an obligation
344. How the Location and Type of School Affects the Racial Scoring Gap on the SAT Test, J.
BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 18, 2004 (on file with author) (noting that whites attending high
schools in large urban areas average 242 points, or 20 percent, above blacks who attend high school
in large cities). In rural areas, the gap drops to 177 points, about a 15 percent gap. Id. There are also
significant differences when comparing public, parochial, and private schools. Id. At public schools,
the racial scoring gap is higher than the national average. Id. At parochial schools, the racial scoring
gap drops to 165 points. Id. Blacks who attend private schools score perform the best, scoring only
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to continue to encourage better academic preparation for college athletes. In
order for this goal to be realistic and achievable, school officials also must
provide qualified teachers and resources to place students in a position where
the NCAA eligibility and college admission requirements do not "screen out"
significant percentages of underrepresented groups.
The rewards associated with academic achievement need to be inculcated
into the student's value system before their athletic prowess is even a factor.
Earlier identification and educational intervention with students diagnosed
with specific learning disabilities will assist this process. To silence the
skeptics, the NCAA and colleges have to also ensure that "objective"
eligibility and admission criteria are not implemented so rigidly that it has a
disparate impact on qualified learning disabled students for whose athletic
skills potentially provide an academic "ticket out of a urban or rural ghetto."
This has to be balanced with continued efforts to shed the NCAA image as
being a "minor league" for many sports. The Hall and Tatum cases clearly
reflect the need to insure that gifted athletes do not manipulate the academic
system, especially under the guise of being learning disabled. The continued
academic scandals provide further evidence that the athletic eligibility process
requires regular monitoring to insure academic integrity.
The NCAA and collegiate institutions that are actively working to improve
the system should be commended rather than disparaged for efforts directed at
enhancing academic integrity in the student-athlete population. The Matthews
and Pryor cases reflect little sympathy by the courts when the NCAA has
made an apparent "good faith" effort to accommodate a student's learning
disability. Students, parents, college recruiters, mental health professionals,
and especially coaches have to maintain an ethical approach toward athletic
eligibility and subsequent academic success by not allowing potential financial
rewards to compromise their integrity. In order to effectively dismiss the
skeptics and allow student-athletes with and without learning disabilities to be
given fair consideration in the college admissions process, as well as academic
success after enrollment, all involved need to make a commitment to follow
the rules when "playing the game."
Yuri Nicholas Walker
138 points, or 11.5 percent, below their white classmates. Id. See also Rosen, supra note 53, at 204
(noting that the Educational Testing Service, the organization that develops the SAT, "has specifically
requested that the NCAA abandon the SAT as a means to establish eligibility standards; however, the
NCAA continues to use the controversial standard"); Shropshire, supra note 55, at 146 (quoting
George Hanford, the then-president of the College Board, as stating "[t]he NCAA's use of a
standardized exam to determine eligibility [was] misguided"). He added that "[t]he SAT was meant
only ... to predict how well students will do academically in their first year of college").
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